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CONTROLLING OPPORTUNISTIC AND
ANTI-COMPETITIVE INTELLECTUAL
PROPERTY LITIGATION
MICHAEL J. MEURER *
Abstract: This Article analyzes two methods of controlling rent-seeking
costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive intellectual
property lawsuits. One method discourages rent-seeking costs by
reducing the credibility of weak lawsuits. This can he accomplished by
restricting preliminary injunctions, encouraging declaratory judgment
suits, adjusting the substantive law to encourage summary judgment for
defendants, and shifting attorney fees from rent-seeking plaintiffs to
prevailing defendants. In addition, antitrust suits have a limited role in
deterring the most egregious anti-competitive conduct. A more extreme
method eliminates rent-seeking costs by restricting or eliminating
certain intellectual property rights. Such an extreme measure is justified
if a right generates relatively little direct social benefit, and pre- and
post-trial control measures are not effective in containing rent-seeking
costs.
INTRODUCTION
Intellectual property (IP) law effectively stimulates the creation
and distribution of information and information-rich products that
are vital to economic growth and well-being.' Unfortunately, it also
promotes harmful rent-seeking by owners of IP rights who undertake
opportunistic and anti-competitive lawsuits. Some IP owners value
their property rights chiefly as "tickets" into court that give them a
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credible threat to sue vulnerable IP users. 2 Socially harmful IP litiga-
tion is common because the rights are easy to get and potentially ap-
ply quite broadly, and the problem is growing worse because of the
expansion of the scope and strength of IP law.3 This Article addresses
rent-seeking that arises when a party seeks to enforce an IP right that
is probably invalid or seeks to stretch a valid right to cover activities
outside the proper scope of the right. Such rent-seeking costs can be
controlled by (I) reducing the risk that parties will acquire invalid IP
rights, (2) making the scope of rights clearer, or (3) using a mix of
procedural and substantive measures that mitigate the harm caused
by lawsuits based on vague or invalid rights.}
Courts and commentators have recognized a similar problem in
the antitrust realm. 5
 Antitrust law is supposed to promote competi-
tion, but it can be used by a plaintiff to exclude competitors or to ex-
tract a wrongful settlement payment.° Some antitrust plaintiffs bring
suits hoping the courts will mistakenly block activities that increase
the efficiency of the plaintiffs' competitors.? Antitrust law has re-
2
 "[The patent] system ... gives you a government grant which is little more than a
right to litigate ...." Ronald Zibelli & Steven D. Glazer, An Interview with Circuit judge S. fay
Plagm; J. PROPRIETA RY Rrs., Dec. 1993, at G (objecting to the weakness of patent rights).
3 See EXPANDING "IIIE BOUNDS OF INTEELEGTuAL PROPERTY, at x (Rochelle Cooper
Dreyfuss et al. eds., 2001) (noting sui genesis laws have been proposed or enacted to cover
"products as diverse as semiconductor chips, databases, industrial design, artistic perform-
ances, computer programs, and genetic maps."); ThCHAI BENICLER, A Political Economy of the
Public Domain: Markets in Information Versus the ilIathetplace of Ideas, in ExPANDING THE
HOUNDS OF INTELLECTUAL. PROPERTY, supra, at 270 ("[The belief" that more property
rights necessarily lead to the production of more, and more diverse, information ... has
been used in varying degrees to justify a phenomenal expansion of intellectual property
rights in sundry directions over the past few years."); Robert P. Merges, One Hundred Yeats
of Solicitude: Intellectual Property Law, 1900-2000, 88 CAL. L. REv. 2187, 2239-40 (2000) (as-
serting that the belief that economic policy should be grounded in a competitive baseline
is starting to give way to a notion that all sorts of intangibles deserve protection from some
form of property law).
4
 This Article catalogues a variety of control methods and conducts a preliminary
analysis of the relative effectiveness of different methods. It does not assess the costs that
might result from overbroad application of the methods, or possible harm to the produc-
tive incentives of IP owners.
See William J. Baumol & Januz A. Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28
J.L. & EcoN. 247, 250-51 (1985) ("the social costs of rent-seeking protectionism can be
very high").
6 Id. at 252-53 (asserting that treble damages encourage rent-seeking, though they
also play a desirable deterrent role).
7 For example, Chrysler challenged a GM-Toyota joint venture. Chrysler's incentives
were exactly the opposite of the social welfare goals—Chrysler would oppose a joint ven-
ture that created socially desirable productive efficiency for GM and Toyota because that
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sponded8 by crafting standing rules that exclude plaintiffs who are
unlikely to be good "private attorneys generar9 clarifying vague anti-
trust criteria so defendants can avoid the risk of anti-competitive
suits," and easing summary judgment requirements for antitrust de-
fendants in certain circumstances to discourage opportunistic law-
suits."
IP law probably needs to follow the same path as antitrust law by
taking stronger substantive and procedural steps to mitigate the harm
from rent-seeking through litigation. Section I of this Article defines
opportunistic and anti-competitive IP lawsuits and explains when they
are credible. 12 Sections II and III show how certain pre-trial and post-
trial measures help control socially harmful litigation by undercutting
its credibility." Better control is possible if trial judges are more vigi-
lant and use their discretion to restrict the availability of preliminary
injunctions and to award attorney's fees to defendants in opportunis-
tic and anti-competitive cases. Control can be further enhanced by
encouraging declaratory judgments and summary judgments in favor
of defendants. There is also a limited role for antitrust judgments
against anti-competitive plaintiffs.
Section 1V explores the feasibility of ex ante filters that could re-
duce the prevalence of weak suits." The most encouraging develop-
ments on this front are efforts by the U.S. Supreme Court to restrict
trade dress protection and by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed-
eral Circuit to restrict the scope and increase the clarity of patent
claims. Changes to patent and trademark examination are not likely
to reduce rent-seeking costs significantly. But imposing stricter stan-
would hurt Chrysler, and Chrysler would favor a joint venture that caused a socially harm-
ful output restriction because that would help Chrysler. Id. at 256-57.
Whether these responses were good policy is open to debate. Measures that control
rent•seeking litigation sometimes discourage too much socially desirable litigation. See
LAwRENct: A. SULLIVAN & WARREN S. GRIMES, THE LAW OF ANTITRUST AN INTEGRATED
HANDBOOK 910-13 (2000).
9 Sec Cargill, Inc. v. Monfort of Colo., Inc., 479 U.S. 104, 109-13 .(1986); Joseph F.
Brodley, Antitrust Standing in Private Merger Cases: Reconciling Private Incentives and Public
Enforronent Goals, 94 Mimi. L. REV. 1, 2-10 (1995) (warning that the courts have gone too
far in restricting private merger enforcement).
Cf. Baumol & Ordover, swim note 5, at 254. See generally Ronald A. Cass & Keith N.
Hylton, Antitrust Intent, 74 S. CAL. L. REv. 657 (2001).
II Sec Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 585-88. 597
(1986).
12 Sec infra notes 16-102 and accompanying text.
19 Sec infra notes 103-197 and accompanying text.
14 Sec infra notes 198-219 and accompanying text.
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dards for certain IP rights might be an effective and socially desirable
complement to ex post control measures that are never completely
effective. t5
I. ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF OPPORTUNISTIC AND ANTI-COMPETITIVE
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWSUITS
A. Weak Lawsuits and Credible Threats
A lawsuit is weak if the objective probability of successfully prov-
ing infringement is low at the time of filing. The probability of success
is evaluated using the knowledge of a hypothetical plaintiff who files
after conducting a reasonable investigation. 16 The probability of suc-
cess may be low because the right asserted likely does not cover the
defendant's behavior or because the right is unlikely to be valid. A
weak lawsuit is anti-competitive" if the defendant's alleged infringing
behavior occurs in a market the plaintiff participates in or iniencls to
enter; otherwise, a weak lawsuit is opportunistic.
A plaintiff usually files an anti-competitive lawsuit seeking to im-
pair the defendant's performance in their shared market or even to
exclude the defendant from the market completely;° a plaintiff files
an opportunistic lawsuit seeking a settlement payment.° Opporttmis-
15 See Merges, supra note 3, at 2190-91 ("There is a fine line ... between a meritorious
property right and an odious government enforced rent.").
IB But see Robert G. Bone, Modeling Thvolous Suits, 145 U. PA. L. REV. 519, 533 (1997)
(stating that a lawsuit is frivolous "(1) when a plaintiff files knowing facts that establish
complete (or virtually complete) absence of merit as an objective matter on the legal theo-
ries alleged, or (2) when a plaintiff files without conducting a reasonable investigation
which, if Conducted, would place the lawsuit in prong (1).").
" One might consider every intellectual property lawsuit against a competitor to be
anti-competitive because exclusionary remedies are available to successful plaintiffs. That
would be simplistic because it ignores the incentive effect produced by the profit derived
from the exclusionary power of intellectual property. Nevertheless, time label "anti-
competitive" might be appropriate when applied to strong claims that are derived from an
underlying IP law that is overly protective. Regardless of the appropriate label, those issues
are outside the scope of this Article,
18
 This Article does not address the problem of IP licenses designed to cartelize a mar-
ket. One goal of this Article is to understand how to control anti-competitive litigation by
structuring the law to reduce the credibility of weak IP lawsuits. Licenses that facilitate
cartels do not depend on the credibility of the threat to sue; strong, weak, or sham rights
can all be used to disguise collusion. Therefore, the control measures discussed in this
Article are not targeted at the problem of collusion.
"' Lawyers and economists have devoted significant attention to the problem of oppor-
tunistic lawsuits; they have developed a variety of theories to explain such suits, and a vari-
ety of policy recommendations to control them. See generally Robert H. Gertner, Asymmetric
Information, Uncertainty, and Selection Bias in Litigation, U. Cm. L. Sm. ROUNIYIABLE 75
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tic and anti-competitive lawsuits are initially puzzling because it is
hard to see why a defendant would yield to the threat of a weak suit.
The puzzle can be solved by explaining why a defendant rationally
believes a plaintiff with a weak lawsuit would actually prosecute the
lawsuit through trial. There are three main reasons weak IP lawsuits
are credible."
First, the scope of IP rights is highly variable. Reasonable judges
often disagree on the interpretation of a patent claim. The standard
for trademark infringement, likelihood of consumer confusion, is in-
herently noisy. Copyright law asks the fact-finder to make a difficult
subjective decision whether the defendant unlawfully appropriated
the plaintiff's expressive work. Besides vague standards for infringe-
ment, trials often feature conflicting expert testimony about matters
relevant to the scope of an IP right. Compounding these problems is
the risk of error by judges and juries. Trial errors are difficult to dispel
in IP litigation2 I because the complexity of the evidence can make it
(1993); Bone, supra note 16; Chris Guthrie, Framing Frivolous Litigation: A Psychological The-
ory, 67 U. Cm. L. REV. 163 (2000); Avery Katz, The Effect of Frivolous Lawsuits on the Settlement
of Litigation, 10 [Wet, REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1990); Barry Nalebuff, Credible Pretrial Negotiation,
18 WAND .). ECON. 198 (1987); D. Rosenberg & S. Shaven, A Model in Which Suits Are Brought
for Their Nuisance Value, 5 IN T . 1. REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1985); Steven Shavell, Sharing of Alm,
nation Prior to Settkment or Litigation, 20 RAND J. ECON. 183 (1989). Most of the literature
discusses opportunistic suits in the context of tort, civil rights, or shareholder derivative
suits. See, e.g., Bone, supra note 16, at 529-33.
20 A lawsuit may also be credible when the plaintiff fails to investigate the defendant's
conduct adequately. See Bone, supra note 16, at 550-66. Weak patent and trade dress law-
suits arise when plaintiffs fail to examine defendants' products to see if they are colorably
infringing. See, e.g., Judin v. United States, 110 F.3d 780,784 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (reversing the
Court of Federal Claims and insisting that a Rule 11 sanction should be applied to a patent
owner who only observed an allegedly infringing device from a distance); Loctite Corp. v.
Fel-Pro, Inc., 667 F.2d 577,584-85 (7th Cir. 1981) (requiring expert testing before filing a
patent infringement lawsuit in a case involving a sophisticated technology); Ferraris Med.,
Inc., v. Azimuth Corp., No. 99-66-M, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589, at (D.N.H. July 24,
2002) (concluding in a trade dress infringement case "that neither Ferraris nor its legal
counsel adequately investigated the facts"). A relatively uninformed plaintiff can credibly
prosecute a weak lawsuit until litigation has moved far enough along that the defendant
has a chance to show that its action falls outside the broadest plausible scope of the plain-
airs IP right.
21 A weak lawsuit is credible if the court is likely to err in favor of the plaintiff. Even
though the defendant recognizes that she should win at trial, if the risk of error is high
enough, then the plaintiff holds a credible threat. Risk of trial error is not a plausible ex-
planation of weak lawsuits in some areas of the law because a defendant likely could win
summary judgment and defeat the lawsuit early on at a relatively low cost. See Bone, supra
note 16, at 534-37 (noting that nuisance suits based on trial error are uncommon). For
example, if a tort defendant has proof that an opportunistic plaintiff was injured by some
cause [unrelated to the defendant, then the lawsuit is not credible because it would be easy
to share that evidence with a court. See id.
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difficult for a deserving defendant to win summary judgment or even
prevail at tria1. 22 High variance in the scope of rights makes it
profitable for IP plaintiffs with apparently narrow rights to gamble
that a court will grant them broad rights, A common strategy used in
opportunistic e-commerce lawsuits is to dust off a pre-Internet patent
and argue that the patent claims extend to the Internet. 23
Second, a weak lawsuit may present a credible threat to a defen-
dant who has trouble distinguishing weak lawsuits from strong ones.24
A plaintiff with a weak lawsuit can successfully bluff a defendant be-
cause in the early stages of IP litigation the plaintiff is likely to have
better information about the scope and validity of the IP rights. Walker
Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machinery CI' Chemical Cot p. illustrates the
role of asymmetric information in making weak lawsuits credible . 25
Food Machinery obtained a patent on a sewage treatment process by
fraudulently concealing information that the process had been used
in public more than one year before the filing of a patent applica-
6°11. 26 Food Machinery filed a patent infringement lawsuit when
22 Robert C. Nissen, The Art of the Counterclaim: Festo Won't End Frivolous Infringement
Cases, But It Does Make It Easier to Fight Back, INTELL. PRop.., May 7. 2001, at 64 ("Defending
against frivolous infringement allegations can be a nightmare. At best, after spending
hundreds of thousands or even millions of dollars, a defendant is restored to the position
it held before the case was filed. At worst, a defendant is found liable because the jury was
bewildered by the complex technologies at issue.").
23 Sec Interactive Gift Express, Inc. v. CompuServe, Inc., 231 F.3d 859, 863-64, 877
(Fed. Cir. 2000) (allowing patent owner to try to show that pre-Internet claim language
applies to Internet retail transactions); Brad King, Want Video on Demand? Press Pause,
WIRED News. Sep. 11, 2002, at lutp://wwwwired.com/news/digiwood/0,1412,55026,00 .
Mild (explaining that a company owning a 1992 patent covering video on demand is seek-
ing to license MovieLink, a joint venture of five movie studios that delivers movies over the
Internet; the patent owner has broad claim language in the patent the might be construed
to cover Internet delivery); Brenda Sandburg, Closely Watched Hypedink Patent Case Tossed,
THE RECORDER, Aug. 23, 2002, available at http://www.law.com (discussing British Telecom-
munications PLC v. Prodigy Communications Corp., where the district court judge ruled that a
BT patent covering access to text-based information over a telephone network did not
cover hyper-linking on the Internet; BT hoped to get hundreds of millions of dollars in
royalties). These claims have some plausibility because the doctrine of equivalents has
been used to expand patent rights beyond literal claim language in cases of later devel-
oped technology. For example, patent scope has been expanded in response to the un-
foreseen development of micro-computers.
24 For a model of patent litigation in which plaintiffs with weak claims can successfully
bluff their way to a settlement payment, see generally Michael J. Meurer, The Settlement of
Patent Litigation, 20 RAND J. EcoN. 77 (1989). For a discussion of this type of model outside
the IP context, see Bone, supra note 16, at 54219; Guthrie, supra note 19, at 173 ("frivo-
lous litigation is most likely to occur under conditions of asymmetric information").
25 See 382 U.S. 172, 178 (1965).
26 Id. at 174.
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Walker entered the market. 27 Walker uncovered evidence of the prior
use and proved the patent was invalid; thus, Food Machinery failed in
its attempt to bluff Walker out of the market. 29 It seems likely, how-
ever, that many similar attempts succeed in deterring market entry or
forcing a restrictive license onto an entrant, although we have no way
to observe successful bluffs. 29
Filially, a weak lawsuit may be credible because of the costs it may
impose on the defendant. A defendant may settle an opportunistic
lawsuit to avoid the nuisance of mounting a defense." A defendant
may settle an anti-competitive suit because the cost of a defense
threatens the defendant's solvency." Alternatively; the threat of a
weak lawsuit may deter entry into a market if the plaintiff establishes a
reputation for prosecuting weak suits through to the end. 32 A plaintiff
with a predatory reputation rationally views losing a weak lawsuit. as a
profitable investment in that reputation."
27 Id.
28 See rd.
2° See ROBERT H. Bow THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY AT WAR went 1•1sELe 347
(1978) (expressing concern about the threat of predation through Walker Process-type
fraud); SETil Sinn.stAN, OWNING 'ME FU'DURE 68 (1999) ("[a]n invalid patent is a danger-
ous weapon") (quoting Richard Stamm disparaging the current state of software pat-
ents); Mark A. Lentley, Rational Ignorance at the Patent Office, 95 Nw. U. L. lbw. 1495. 1515
(2001) (describing social costs of "bad" patents); Gary Myers, Litigation as a Predatory Prac-
tice, 80 Ky. L.J. 565, 594 (1992) (noting that litigation can be used to prevent or delay a
competitor's entry into a market).
3° Sec. e.g., Lucian Arye Bebchuk, A New Theory Concerning the Credibility and Success of
Threats to Sue, 25 J. LEGAL S'11.111. 371, 373 (1996); Rosenberg Sc Shaven, supra note 19, at 4-
6. Bone argues this approach does not explain large nuisance settlement payments. The
magnitude of the settlement payment in these models depends on the difference in litiga-
tion costs borne by the defendant compared to the plaintiff. Bone explains that most law-
suits do not feature large asymmetries in the costs borne by plaintiffs and defendants. See
Bone, supra note 16, at 537-41. IP cases often do impose much higher litigation costs on
defendants than .plaintiffs. One source of asymmetry arises from disruption of the defen-
dant's business caused by preliminary injunctions and other factors. See infra notes 103-
128 and accompanying text. Another asymmetry arises because some opportunistic
plaintiffs sue multiple defendants and spread the cost of litigation across those cases.
31 Sec L. Bailin & Son, Inc. v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 492 (2d Cir. 1976) (en bane) ("lb
extend copyrightability to minuscule variations would simply put a weapon for harassment
in the hands of mischievous copiers intent on appropriating and monopolizing public
domain work.").
32 For a non-IP example of bad faith litigation deterring entry, see Otter Mil Power Co.
v. United States, 410 U.S. 366. 368 (1973) (noting that power company maintained monop-
oly by using litigation to prevent rival's entry).
33 See Patrick Bolton et al., Predatory Pricing: Strategic Theory and Legal Policy, 88 GEO. L.J.
2239, 2300-01 (2000) (describing reputation effect predation). A number of commenta-
tors have developed reputational models. Sec David M. Kreps & Robert Wilson, Reputation
and Imperfect Information, 27 J. LOON. THEORY 253 (1982); Paul Milgrom & John Roberts,
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Predatory theories of monopolization have fallen out of favor in
antitrust law; the Supreme Court skeptically stated that predatory
pricing is nearly always irrational 54 Such skepticism is not warranted,
though, because recent. economic theory and evidence provides
strong support for concerns about the danger that predatory pricing
poses." Although predatory litigation has not been studied as closely
as predatory pricing, it seems more likely to succeed." Predatory liti-
gation has an advantage over predatory pricing because the cost to
the predator declines after the first lawsuit—the plaintiff can use the
work product from the first litigation in subsequent litigation. 37
Predatory pricing does not offer a comparable advantage; the preda-
tor has to reduce its prices to combat every new entrant and thus in-
curs a relatively constant cost.38
B. Opportunistic Snits
Anecdotal evidence suggests that the problem of opportunistic IP
litigation is serious and getting worse." Defendants fear the high cost
of IP litigation 4° and settle opportunistic claims to avoid that cost:" I
Predation, Reputation and Entry Deterrence, 27 J. Ecort. THEORY 280 (1982); Garth Saloner,
Predation, Mergers, and Incomplete Information. 18 RAND J. ECON, 165 (1987).
34 See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 588-91 (1986).
Even though courts are skeptical of predatory pricing claims there is a high level of anti-
trust enforcement directed against it. See Bolton at al.. supra note 33. at 2266-67. Courts
are also reluctant to impose liability for predatory product innovation because they fear
they will unduly inhibit innovation. See Myers, supra note 29, at 580-86.
55 See Bolton et al.. supra note 33, at 2244-49 (recounting ample empirical and ex-
perimental evidence of predatory pricing and concluding "present judicial skepticism
about predatory pricing assumes that predation is extremely rare, but sound empirical and
experimental studies, as well as modern economic theory, do not justify this assumption").
36 See infra notes 65-99 and accompanying text; see also Myers, supra note 29, at 601,
Predatory litigation is more difficult to detect, especially when the lawsuit has some merit.
See generally Michael W. Bien, Litigation as an Antitrust Violation: Conflict Between the First
Amendment and the Sherman Act, 16 U.S.F. L. REv. 4 l (1981).
37 See Myers, supra note 29, at 599.
38
 Predatory pricing might place greater costs on the predator than the prey because
the predator suffers a loss across a larger share of the market. Myers, supra note 29, at 597.
In contrast, litigation favors the plaintiff because the plaintiff gets to choose the forum and
the initial direction of the discovery. Id. at 598.
39 See Brenda Sandburg, Battling the Patent Trolls,TuE RECORDER, July 30, 2001, available
at http://www.law.com/jsp/statearchivejsp?type=Article&oldid=ZZZ ,IDX7MSPC (noting
that in 1999, patent claims against Intel totaled over $15 billion).
40 Sec Teresa Riordan, Trying to Cash In on Patents, June 10, 2002, N. TIMES, at C2.
available at http://wwwnytimes.com/2002/06/10/technology/l0PATE,html  (reporting
the average cost of patent litigation is $2 million); Sandburg, supra note 39.
41 See SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 55. Many defendants acquiesce rather than face the
expense of fighting an infringement suit. See id.
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offer some examples from patent, 42 trademark,'" and copyright law44
with a caveat: it is difficult to know whether a particular lawsuit. is op-
portunistic and so it is more appropriate to present the following as
possible examples of opportunistic suits.
The explosion of e-commerce patents has generated many com-
plaints about opportunistic patent litigation. 45 An alleged example
relates to die company E-Data, which sent letters to 75,000 companies
informing them that they were infringing an E-Data patent and asking
them to pay royalties between $5,000 and $50,000.46 The company
owns a patent which arguably covers financial transactions on the
Internet. 47 Several high-profile companies agreed to license the pat-
ent but most refused. E-Data sued forty-one of the companies for pat-
ent infringement. 48 This case and other notorious e-commerce cases
are criticized because the inventions appear to be obvious." or the
claims are not nearly as broad as purported by the plaintiffs. 5°
42 See Julie E. Cohen, Reverse Engineering and the Rise of Electronic Vigilantism: Intellectual
Property Implications of "Lock-Out" Programs, 68 S. CAL. L. REv. 1091, 1178 (1995) (Comp-
ton's multimedia patent).
43 See Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the Death of Common Sense, 108 YALE
L.J. 1687, 1696-97 (1999) (describing trademark claims based on the registered trade-
marks "Class of 2000" and the yellow smiley-face, and characterizing these claims as "frivo-
lous" under "traditional trademark law").
44 See Arnstein v. Porter, 154 F.2d 464, 468 (2d Cir. 1946); LAWRENCE LESSIG, Tim Fu-
-PURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD 4 (2001) (citing ex-
amples of hold-up of movies by owners of copyrights pmtecting works incidentally appear-
ing in movie sets).
45 Troy Wolverton, Patent Lawsuit Could Sting aBay, CNET NEws.com , Sept. 5, 2002, at
http://news.com.com/2100-1017-956638.html . Thomas Woolston. an inventor and pat-
ent attorney, has been awarded four patents related to online auctions and has ten others
pending: he is suing eBay for infringement. Amazon.com, Priceline.com ,
Barnes&Noble.com . and Expedia have also all been targeted for lawsuits. Id.
46 SeeSiiIII.MAN, Sttpla note 29. at 78-80.
47 Id.
48 Id.
49 See Cohen, supra note 42, at 1178-80.
60 See supra note 23; see also Lynne McKenna Frazier. Small Candy Maker Fights &commerce
Patent "Extortion," SlucoNVALLEv.com , Nov. 4, 2002, at littp://www.siliconvalley.rom/m1d/
siliconvalley/news/4454889.1inn (explaining that Patent No. 5,576,951 allegedly covers
"automated sales and services system" and Patent No. 6,239,319 allegedly covers an "auto-
matic business and financial transaction-processing system."); Lemley, supra note 29, at
1517-19. On November 15, 2002, the House Small Business Committee cosponsored a
conference on IP issues for small business that covered the problem of opportunistic IP
suits.
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A string of opportunistic trademark suits was brought by a com-
pany called S Industries." "[T] he company filed at least 33 trademark
infringement lawsuits in the district court between 1995 and 1997.' 52
The plaintiff used the mark Sentra with over-the-counter, discount
computer mouse pads. 53
 In one case it sued a company named Cen-
tra, which used the mark in association with expensive data manage-
ment software bought by petrochemical, aerospace, and other manu-
facturing industries." The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh
Circuit found that the lawsuit lacked merit and was oppressive, and
that "plaintiff's conduct unreasonably increased the cost of defending
against the suit."55
Opportunistic copyright suits typically pit a minor author against
a later, successful author.58
 The plaintiff claims the defendant copied
from the plaintiff's earlier work. Some enterprising plaintiffs strength-
en their claims by distributing their works to potential defendants;
then they can credibly argue that the defendants had access to the
works. 57
 Opportunistic copyright claims are also likely when both the
plaintiff and the defendant base their work on something in the pub-
lic domain. 58
 The chutzpah award in this field goes to Ashleigh Bril-
liant, who coined 7500 aphorisms and mounted more than a hundred
successful copyright infringement suits. 59
51 See S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000. Inc., 249 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
award of attorney's fees to defendant because trademark claims were meritless and be-
cause of dilatory tactics).
52 Id. at 629. S Industries's "actions here look to be part of a pattern of abusive and
improper litigation with which the company and Lee Stoller, its sole shareholder, have
burdened the courts of this circuit." Id.
53 Id. at 627.
54 Id.
55 Id. "During 4 years of litigation ... S Industries failed to produce evidence of a sin-
gle sale of 'Sentra' brand computer software or hardware." Id.
56
 See, e.g., Litchfield v. Spielberg, 736 F.2d 1352 (9th Cir. 1984). The court held that
the movie E.T. did not infringe the derivative rights of the creator of the screenplay Lokey
from Maldernar because the screenplay was not substantially similar to the movie. Sec id. at
1358; sec also Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469.
57 See Litchfield, 736 F.2d at 1354.
" See Snyder; 536 F.2d at 489-90.
59 See SHULAIAN, supra note 29, at 9. A plaintiff is more likely to succeed by bringing a
sequence of frivolous suits like those brought by E-Data, S Industries, and Brilliant than by
bringing an isolated suit. The plaintiff can develop a reputation for imposing costs on
defendants even if that also means costs to the plaintiff. The reputation for being tough
makes the frivolous claim more credible and more valuable. See Reinhard Selten, The
Chain Store Paradox, 9 THEORY & DEctsION 127 (1978), and subsequent work by economists
on reputation.
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Opportunistic IP suits impose direct and indirect costs on defen-
dants and society. Besides settlement payments, 6° there are sizable di-
rect:legal costso and indirect costs borne by potential defendants who
work to minimize their exposure to opportunistic litigation. 62 Firms
reduce the risk of copyright and trade secret litigation by returning
unsolicited documents, making software in "clean rooms' that mini-
mize the exposure of programmers to copyrighted code, and docu-
menting independent creation.° Opportunistic (and anti-competi-
tive) patent and trade dress cases may deter firms from entering new
markets or adopting new product features or designs. 64
There are several reasons the incidence of opportunistic IP litiga-
tion is increasing. First, intellectual property has become more vain-
able,65 and the number of patents, copyrights, and trademarks has
increased rapidly.66 The rate of IP litigation has grown comparably.°
60 Transfer payments are (usually not a source of social loss. Settlement payments to
end frivolous lawsuits only Cause a social loss to the extent that they distort the decision of
a firm to enter a market protected by IP rights because of the fear of litigation.
61 Amy Harmon, Suddenly, 'Idea Mips" Take on a New Global Urgency,N.Y.Tunis, Nov. 11,
2001, at 4A 30. available at hup://www.nytimes.com/2001/11/11/business/11PRORhunl
(reporting that patent litigation cost American companies $4 billion in the year 2000); Del
Jones, Businesses Battle Over Intellectual Property: Courts Choked with Lawsuits to Protect Ideas and
Profits, USA Tonnv, Aug. 2, 2000, at 1 B, available at 2000 %VI, 5785645 (describing the flood
of patent litigation). Large firms that fear frequent opportunistic suits might be able to
develop an effective reputation as tough defendants. Thus, small firms might be relatively
more vulnerable to opportunistic suits.
62 See Robert G. Bone, A New Look at Trade Secret Late: Doctrine in Search offustification, 86
CAL. L. Rev. 241, 273-79 (1998) (noting the high social cost of trade secret litigation).
63 JULIE COHEN ET Al.., COPYRIGHT IN A GLOBAL. INFORMATION ECONOMY 328 (2002)
("In the face of decisions like Ty and Bouchat, establishing procedures to document the
creative process has become a matter of pressing concern for companies that create and
commission copyrighted works.").
64 See infra notes 72-99 and accompanying text.
65 See Kevin G. Rivette & David Kline, Discovering New Mite in Intellectual Property, HARV.
Bus. REV., Jan.-Feb. 2000, at 57-58 (noting that IBM boosted its patent royalties from $30
million in 1990 to $1 billion in 2000); Sandburg, supra note 39 (reporting that from 1980
to 1999, royalties on patents in the United States grew from $3 billion to nearly $110 bil-
lion).
66 Sec Michael H. Dessent, Digital Handshakes In Cyberspace Under E-Sign: "Their's A New
Sheriff In Town)", 35 U. Rim L. REV. 943, 945 (2002); Harmon, supra note 61 (reporting
that patent applications and copyright registrations are soaring); Lemley, supra note 29, at
1497-99; Glen E. Weston, Book Review, 54 GEO. WAsti. L. REV. 143, 143 (1985) (reviewing
J. THOMAS NICCARTHV, TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPIAMON (1984)).
67 See Graeme B. Dinwoodie, The Death of Ontology: A Teleological Approach to Trademark
Law, 84 IOWA L. REV. 611, 623 n.58 (1999) (accelerating frequency of federal trade dress
lawsuits); Lemley, supra note 43, at 1700 (noting that product configuration cases have
grown explosively in the last fifteen years); Brenda Sandborg, A New Industry Transforms the
Patent System: Congress, Corporations Eye Reform as Power of Patent Enforcers Grows, Tur RE-
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Opportunistic suits are likely to increase as legitimate suits increase
because it is easier to hide an opportunistic lawsuit and bluff your way
to a settlement payment. Second, a growing market for the sale of IP
rights makes it easier to "enter the market" for opportunistic IP litiga-
tion. 68
 Finally, in recent years patent plaintiffs have been effectively
organized and financed by entrepreneurs specializing in patent litiga-
tion and licensing.69 Patent lawsuit investors avoid champerty7° laws by
purchasing ownership or joint ownership of patents. 71
CORDER, July 30, 2001, at http://xrww.lawcom ("With the growth in patent licensing, the
number of patent suits has doubled in the past decade, from 1,171 in 1991 to 2,484 in
2000, according to data compiled by Paul janicke, a professor at the University of Houston
Law Center.").
68 Brenda Sandburg, Patent Blockbuster Goes to High Court: IP attorneys looking to U.S. SU n
PreMO Court to clear up confusion over "Festo," THE RECORDER, June 18, 2001, at http://www.
law.com ("Matthew Powers, a partner at Weil, Gotshal Manges [said that Festo] 'elimi-
nates a lot of slop out there.' , M here are companies that buy a patent for $50,000 at a
bankruptcy auction and then decide to sue the world for it. 'They are counting on the slop
factor of the doctrine of equivalents to give them leverage to get a big settlement.'...").
69 See Linda Himelstein, Investors Wanted For Lawsuits, Bus. WK., Nov. 15, 1993, at 78;
Susan Lorde Martin, Financing Plaintiffs' Lawsuits: An Increasingly Popular (and Legal) Busi-
ness, 33 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 57, 58 (2000); Poonam Puri, Financing of Litigation by Third-
Party Investors: A Share of justice, 36 OSGOODE Ham. U. 515, 541 (1998); Sandburg, supra
note 39 ("'In the last three to five years, the business has been growing exponentially be-
cause everybody is getting into the act.' said David Braunstein. vice president of the intel-
lectual property consulting firm Fairfield Resources International Inc. of Stamford,
Conn."). A new corporation in Canada has been formed to take advantage of the relaxed
standards in place in most states. This publicly traded corporation's sole business is to
finance large patent infringement lawsuits in the U.S. Martin, supra, at 82. Instead of sim-
ply providing the financial backing for the infringement lawsuit, the company buys an
interest in the patent and then joins the first patent holder as a plaintiff in the case, receiv-
ing compensation for whatever reward the lawsuit brings. Id. at 82-83. As an alternative to
au ownership stake, patent litigation is done on a contingency basis with percentages as
high as 45%. Sandburg, supra note 39.
70 "Champerty is a practice in which one person, the champertor, agrees to support
another in bringing a legal action, in exchange for part of the proceeds of the litigation. It
is a form of maintenance, which is a general category that includes any agreement by
which one person finances another's legal action." Martin, supra note 69, at 58. Champerty
is prohibited throughout the U.S. based on fears that champertors will bring frivolous
litigation, harass defendants, increase damages, and resist settlement. Id.
71 Sec Intex Plastic Sales Co. v. Hall, 20 U.S.P.Q.2d (BNA) 1367 (N.D. Cal. 1991), affil
960 F.2d 155 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (holding patent infringement lawsuit valid after patent
holder assigned 65% interest in his patent to WBX partners); Himelstein, supra note 69, at
78.
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C. Anti-competitive Lawsuits
Firms often use IP litigation to exclude their rivals from mar-
kets. 72 Occasionally, firms with broad patents exclude their rivals from
the markets protected by the patents. More commonly, firms use IP
rights to exclude rivals from use of a product. feature, variety; or de-
sign. Exclusionary litigation can be a socially desirable way to secure a
reward to innovative firms; 73 the term "anti-competitive" is resercred
for lawsuits that seek socially undesirable exchtsion. 74 In an ideal IP
system, it would be impossible to mount. an anti-competitive IP lawsuit
because such suits would not be credible. In reality, anti-competitive
lawsuits are possible because undeserving claimants receive presump-
tively valid or at least colorable rights to intellectual property.
Anti-competitive suits achieve an exclusionary outcome through
two different mechanisms. First, some defendants settle because they
fear the plaintiff's IP right will be construed too broadly, or because
they lack information proving the plaintiffs right is invalid. Second,
other defendants may be confident the plaintiff will lose the lawsuit
but still settle simply to avoid the costs of litigation. In addition to
gaining a favorable settlement, the owner of a weak IP right may suc-
ceed in deterring competitors from using his intellectual property
because of the threat of suit. 75
Successful anti-competitive IP litigation does not leave much of a
record, but there are many cases of failed exclusion. 76 Handgards, Inc.
v. Ethicon gives an example of a patent. plaintiff that hoped to bluff its
72 For a thorough discussion of anti-competitive litigation, see generally Myers, supra
note 29.
73 Examples of firms being driven from a market by plaintiffs with strong claims are
easy to find. See, Rivette Kline, supra note 65, at 64-65 (describing how Polaroid won
a $925 million patent judgment against Kodak and forced Kodak out of the instant pho-
tography business); 'Online Music Provider Now Has Second Bidder; N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 15, 2000.
at C4 (describing movie file-sharing service pushed to bankruptcy by a copyright lawsuit
brought by the MPAA); Matt Richtel, Web Company Will Sell Assets to Settle Suit an Music Files,
N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 2, 2000, at Cl.
74 In Grip-Pak. Inc. v. Illinois Tool librks, Inc., Judge Posner wrote that litigation could
be used for improper purposes even when there is probable cause for the litigation; and if
the improper purpose is to use litigation as a tool for suppressing competition in its anti-
trust sense, it becomes a matter of antitrust concern." 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982).
" See id. ("[M]any claims not wholly groundless would never be sued on for their own
sake; the stakes, discounted by the probability of winning, would be too low to repay the
investment in litigation."); see also Myers, supra note 29, at 602-04.
76 Sec Bayer AG V. Biovail Corp., No. 200-CV-128-WCO, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 23907. at
*12 (N.D. Ga. Mar, 27, 2001) (addressing allegedly baseless patent infringement by Bayer
to block competition from generic drug).
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way to an anti-competitive settlement agreenlent. 77 Ethicon controlled
ninety percent of the market for heat-sealed plastic gloves." It tried to
preserve its dominant position by suing an entrant for patent in-
fringement. Ethicon knew the patent was invalid because there was a
previous inventor and because of public use more than one year be-
fore the patent application." Handgards called the bluff, discovered
evidence of the earlier inventor and the prior use, and invalidated the
patent.
Besides patent litigation, trade dress claims related to product
design and configuration pose the gravest threat of predation.° Trade
dress is defined to include packaging, as well as product design and
configuration. Product design and configuration can be protected
under trademark law because it is capable of indicating a source of
origin; for example, the pink color of building insulation indicates
that Owens Corning is the insulation manufacturer. Trade dress pro-
tection must not reach functional features of the trade dress because
those features are exclusively protectable under patent law.
Fermis Medical, Inc. v. Azimuth colp.81 documents anti-competitive
trade dress litigation motivated by the desire to impose litigation costs
and discourage competition. 82 Ferraris made a harness used to hold a
facemask and other equipment on the heads of surgical patients.°
Azimuth and other companies bought these devices from Ferraris and
resold them under their own brand names.° Azimuth stopped buying
its supplies from Ferraris and copied Ferraris's tmpatented design.°
77 743 F.2d 1282 (9th Cir. 1984).
76 Id. at 1294.
79 Id. at 1288.
133 J. Thomas McCarthy, Lanham Act 43(a): The Sleeping Giant is Now Wide Awake, 59
LAW & CONTEMP. Pitons., Spring 1996, 46, 64-67 (discussing potential anti-competitive
effects caused by trade dress protection). McCarthy cites cases that upheld preliminary
trade dress injunctions relating to subject matter that appears to be functional or a busi-
ness method, and laments, 'Judicial distaste for competitive imitation appears to often
turn the scales in a case." Id. at 65. In a recent trade dress infringement lawsuit, the trial
court observed, "It seems reasonably evident that plaintiff's motivation in pursuing these
unsupported claims was rooted in an effort to deter competition by Azimuth." Ferraris,
2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589, at *9,
ei 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589 (D. N.H. July 24, 2002).
82 The trial judge stated the plaintiff's "goal seemed always to be acquisition of mo-
nopolistic control over the manufacture and sale of surgical harnesses with the features of
those it sold, but it had no legal or factual basis to support a design or other patent claim."
Id. at *9-10.
a3 Id. at *1-3.
64 Id.
86 Id.
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Ferraris responded by suing Azimuth on a frivolous trade dress in-
fringement theory8° and other frivolous trademark87 and copyright
infringement theories.°8
Lawsuits like Ferraris are troubling because they can be costly
enough to create financial distress that could delay market. entry or
force a firm to completely abandon a product line already occupied
by a dominant incumbent. 89 Financial market predation is a serious
problem for new firms,9° especially firms in high-technology indus-
88 When awarding attorney's fees to the defendant, the court observed "the trial evi-
dence revealed (and this was not a close or even arguable point) that Ferraris had no legal
or factual basis upon which to claim that its harness design was either non-functional or
had acquired secondary meaning. essential prerequisites to claiming unregistered trade
dress protection." Ferraris, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589, at *3-4.
87 "Ferraris had no legitimate legal or factual basis to assert 'service mark' protection
in the photographic display used by Azimuth, and no basis whatever for claiming that Azi-
muth somehow appropriated a service mark belonging to Ferraris." Id. at *3.
88 "Ferraris had no factual or legal basis upon which to claim copyright protection in
the photographic display or depiction Azitinith used in its catalogue advertisements of its
own Sunkled harnesses—that depiction was plainly and unarguably in the public domain,
as Ferraris knew or should well have known." Id.
89 See id.; Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F. Stipp. 2d 111,113-114,
116 (D. Mass. 2001) (noting that the goal of the trade dress suit was "to intimidate, dis-
courage and financially damage an upstart competitor." The plaintiff's claims were objec-
tively unreasonable and the plaintiff was motivated by "a desire to ... financially damage a
competitor by forcing it into costly litigation." The court emphasized that the plaintiff was
the industry leader and the defendant was a much smaller competitor, and that the plain-
tiff made no attempt to settle.). For a non-IP example,. see Alexander v. Nat'l Farmers
01g., where two dairy producers engaged in a pattern of abusive litigation against a small
competitor, and defendants considered sponsoring third-party litigation in order to in-
crease costs on plaintiff. 687 F.2d 1173 (8th Cir. 1982).
99 Established firms frequently sue departing employees, alleging that the start-up
benefited from misappropriated trade secrets.
Indeed, the circumstances of trade secret cases and the uncertainty of trade
secret law create incentives for frivolous litigation designed to harass competi-
tors rather than to obtain relief for trade secret misappropriation. For exam-
ple, a company might sue ex-employees who leave to start a competing firm
in order to hinder their ability to raise capital during the start-tip phase.
Frivolous suits of this sort not only add to litigation costs, they also chill com-
petition.
Bone, supra note 62, at. 279. Start-ups are . also vulnerable to predatory trademark claims
based on the similarity of marketing practfces of the established firm and the start-tip. See
PS Promotions, Inc. v. Stern, No. 97 C 3742,2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096, at *2-3 (N.D. Ill.
Mar. 22, 2001). In PS Promotions the plaintiff was required to pay attorney's fees to defen-
dant who was a former employee. See id. The plaintiff brought false advertising and false
designation of origin claims based on the defendant's use of promotional materials the
defendant had created while working for the plaintiff. See id.
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tries.91
 Investors with limited information often design financial ar-
rangements that are contingent on easily observed performance
measures—especially cash flow. A predator can sabotage its prey's re-
lationship with investors by causing cash-flow problems. 92 Investors are
not well enough informed about the prey's actions and economic
conditions to know whether financial problems result from predation,
bad management, or some other cause.
Predatory litigation reduces cash flow because of the high cost of
1P litigation and a variety of other indirect costs. 93 Litigation can sour
a defendant's credit rating. 94 A predatory plaintiff can divert custom-
ers from a defendant by threatening the defendant's customers with a
lawsuit.96
 Furthermore, the plaintiff can use a preliminary injunction
to block the defendant's production and sales before trial. 96
Costly predatory tactics are irrational unless the predator can re-
coup its litigation cost. 97 A preliminary injunction and the deterrent
91 See Bolton et al., supra note 33, at 2248 ("[Plredatory pricing may pose a special
threat in rapidly growing, high-technology industries, which often involve intellectual
property and continuing innovation."); Dawn KRW:11110t0, Lawsuits Dampen Its' File Sharing
Enthusiasm, CNET NEWS.COM , Sept. 4, 2000, at lutp://nosts,com.com/2100-1023-24527 .
html?legacy=cnet ("The threat of vicarious liability has scared off many venture firms from
the file-sharing arena.").
92 See Bolton et al., supra note 33, at 2286; Troy Wolverton, PayPal, CertCo End Patent
Spat, ZDNET NEWS, Apr. 29. 2002, at http://zdnet ,com.com/2110-1106-894679.hurd (ex-
plaining that the defendant complained that patent lawsuit was designed to delay defen-
dant's IPO; the defendant made a settlement payment but did not take a patent license).
n Sec Handguards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 991 (9th Cir. 1979) (claiming
that Ethicon, the defendant, "had generated adverse publicity regarding its infringement
actions, .. , threatening potential customers of the plaintiff, with the result that vital cor-
porate resources were committed to defense of the infringement actions, Handgards' rela-
tions with potential customers were impaired. a proposed joint venture was aborted, and
the company found itself unable to obtain outside financing necessary for it to remain
competitive in the industry."); Jean 0. Lanjouw & Josh Lerner, Tilting the Table? The Use of
Preliminary Injunctions, 44 J.L. & EcoN. 573, 591 (2001) (slating that smaller firms have
higher litigation costs and stiffer greater indirect costs caused by the dilution of manage-
ment's equity ownership); Myers, supra note 29, at 590-91 ("A target firm may be forced to
divulge proprietary information, such as trade secrets, new product developments, and
marketing strategies in the course of discovery, While a suit is pending, the target firm may
also be forced to disclose its contingent liability to creditors. accountants, and others. This
revelation would hamper its ability to obtain the funds necessary to compete.").
94 Sec Myers, supra note 29, at 590-91. Creditors are generally unwilling to extend
credit while litigation is in process or without a legal opinion as to the merits of the claim.
95 Sec id. at 600.
96 Sec Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 93, at 574 (explaining that preliminary injunctions
induce patent infringement defendants to settle); see also infra Section ILA.
97 See generally Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209
(1993).
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effect of even a weak IP right give a valuable lead-time advantage. 98
Ultimately, the predator hopes to more than recoup its cost of litiga-
tion by reducing competition and raising prices. This is most likely to
occur when the plaintiff has greater financial resources than the de-
fendant."
There are countermeasures that help some small firms ward off
IP litigation by large rivals. A small chip design company averted a
patent infringement lawsuit from Intel by purchasing a patent from a
bankrupt firm that potentially covered Intel chips.'" Another microe-
lectronics firm was rescued from financial distress (caused by a patent.
infringement suit) through a friendly takeover by a white knight ] °t
Generally, such countermeasures are not available because transac-
tion costs, private information, and free-rider problems discourage
the formation of a coalition that might battle the predator)"
II. PRE-TRIAL CONTROL OF SOCIALLY HARMFUL IP LITIGATION
A. Preliminary Injunctions
Despite the restrictive standard for granting preliminary injunc-
tions,'" they are common in patent and copyright cases.t 0" To get a
98 Sec Arti Rai, Addressing the Patent Gold Rush: The Role of Deference to PTO Patent Denials,
2 WAsn. U. J.L. & PoCv 199,212 (2000).
99 The belief that deep pockets give a predator an advantage was emphasized by Telser.
See L G. Telser, Cutthroat Competition and the Long Purse, 9 j,L. & EcoN. 259 (1966). Critics
argued that a viable competitor would never succumb to predation because financial mar-
kets are so efficient. More recent theory offers a variety of reasons why prey cannot obtain
access to capital markets on the same terms as predators and why financial distress may be
an effective weapon. See Bolton et al., supra note 33, at 2285-90.
09 See Rivette & Kline, supra note 65, at 62.
1131 Id. at 63.
102 See Bolton et al., supra note 33, at 2322-23. Reorganization in bankruptcy or trans-
fer of the prey's assets to another firm are not likely to be successful countermeasures to
predation. Id. at 2289-90. The possibility that a successor firm will acquire the prey's assets
does not deter predatory pricing because (1) in some cases the prey's assets are too small
to achieve efficient operating scale, (2) the successor will lag far behind in gaining market
share in a network industry, (3) fungible assets will sell at the market price not a discount,
(9) customers may be shy to leave the predator, (5) the predator may obtain the prey's
assets, and (6) successor firms are apt to fear the predator. Id. at 2326-27.
I" See CHARLES MAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE & PROCEDURE § 2948. at 129
(1995) (It is frequently observed that a preliminary injunction is an extraordinary and
drastic remedy ....").
104 See Romur P. MERGES ET AL., INTELLECTUAL PROPER'IV IN Tut Nrw TEktiNni.oca-
cat Act: 554 (2000) (noting that preliminary injunctions are routine in copyright cases if
the plaintiff can show likelihood of infringement); Lanjouw & Lerner, supra note 93, at
594 (preliminary injunctions reqested in 19% of patent cases).
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preliminary injunction a plaintiff must show (1) a reasonable likeli-
hood of success on the merits, (2) that irreparable harm will result if
preliminary relief is not granted, (3) that the balance of hardships
favors the plaintiff, and (4) that granting the injunction will not dis-
serve the public interest. 05
 Preliminary injunctions are common in
patent and copyright cases because the courts find irreparable injury
quite easily and are reluctant to invoke the public interest in avoiding
opportunistic and anti-competitive suits.'"
Preliminary injunctions promote opportunistic and anti-competi-
tive suits by disrupting the defendant's business, raising the total cost.
of litigation, and causing financial distress. 107
 Empirical evidence
shows that preliminary injunctions tend to be used in patent. cases
mostly by large firms that seek to impose a financial burden on
smaller rivals.'" The financial burden caused by a preliminary injunc-
tion is exacerbated by the "particular difficulty of raising external
funds to finance litigation." Therefore, preliminary injunctions may
be especially harmful in innovative industries "driven by smaller, more
vulnerable, venture-capital-based firms.” 110
The harm from opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litigation
can be alleviated by reducing the availability . of preliminary injunc-
tions."' Ideally, judges would deny preliminary injunctions to plain-
105 See Am. Red Cross v. Palm Beach Blood Bank, Inc., 143 F.3d 1407, 1410 (11th Cir.
1998); New England Braiding Co., Inc. v. A.W. Chesterton Co., 970 F.2d 878, 882 (Fed. Cir.
1992). "The chief function of a preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo until
the merits of the controversy can be fully and fairly adjudicated." Ass'n of Gen. Contractors
of Am. v. City ofJacksonville, 896 F.2d 1283, 1284 (11th Cir. 1990).
'°6 See H.H. Robertson Co. v. United Steel Deck, Inc., 820 F.2d 384, 390 (Fed. Cir.
1987) (presumption of irreparable barns in patent cases); cf. Polaroid V. Eastman Kodak
Co., No. 76-1634-Z, 1985 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15003, at "5-9 (D. Mass. Oct. 11, 1985) (refus-
ing to stay injunction pending appeal despite harm to employees and public); MERGES Ur
AL., supra note 104, at 554 (stating that irreparable harm is easily found in copyright
cases).
107 Lanjouw & Lerner, so pro note 93, at 573-74 (reporting anecdotal evidence that
firms seek preliminary injunctions in patent cases "to impose financial stress on their ri-
vals").
1 °8 Sec id. at 575-76, 595 (reporting empirical evidence that the financial strength of
the plaintiff is significantly correlated with the use of preliminary injunctions in patent
cases).
1 °0 Id. at 574.
110
 Id. at 575.
11 ' See Random House, Inc. v. Rosetta Books LLC, 283 F.3d 490, 491 (2d Cir. 2002)
(finding that the district court judge did not abuse discretion by refusing to grant a pre-
liminary injunction, considering low probability of success by plaintiff and hardship to
defendant); Amazon.com v. Barnesandnoble.com , 239 F.3d 1343, 1347 (Fed. Cir. 2001)
(refusing preliminary injunction request because of low probability of patent validity).
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tiffs with weak lawsuits because, by definition, such suits are not likely
to succeed; but the facts that make weak lawsuits credible also create
problems for judges. At an early stage of litigation, the judge, like the
defendant, may have difficulty assessing the scope and validity of the
IP right." 2 A desirable reform would eliminate the presumption of
patent validity in the context of a preliminary injunction, thereby in-
creasing the burden on a plaintiff to show a likelihood of success." 3
Some judges have shown sensitivity to the problems created by pre-
liminary injunctions, and the law gives trial judges enough flexibility
to accommodate a significant shift in practice." 4 Judges should attend
more closely to the financial distress imposed on defendants and show
Judges can also exert some control over preliminary injunctions by requiring bonds
from plaintiffs and choosing appropriately narrow terms for the injunction. Rule 65(c)
gives a federal district court judge discretion to determine what bond a plaintiff should
post in support of a preliminary injunction. FED. R. Cm P. 65(c). Bonds are not always
effective as a measure for controlling socially harmful litigation because the bonds are
usually small or nominal if the plaintiff is small or capital-constrained. See Erin Connors
Morton, Security for Interlocutory Injunctions Under Rule 65(c): Exceptions to the Rule Gone Awry,
46 HASTINGS L.J. 1863, 1895 (1995). Furthermore, the bonds only compensate defen-
dants, not consumers who suffer from output restrictions made possible by the preliminary
injunction. For a model showing that preliminary injunctions essentially implement a col-
lusive market outcome, see John R. Boyce & Aldan Hollis, Preliminary Injunctions and
Damage Rules in Patent Law (Judy 10, 2002) (unpublished manuscript, at http://econ.
ucalgary.ca/fac-files/boyce/injunctions%20and%20damages.pdf).
Defendants have some measure of control through suits based on malicious prosecu-
tion against plaintiffs who obtain preliminary injunctions in bad faith. See Wmcarr ur AL.,
supra note 103, § 2973, at 463-64.
112 Sec Laura W. Stein, The Court and the Community: Why Non-Party Interests Should Count
in Preliminary Injunction Actions, 16 Rnv. LrrIG. 27, 47 (1997) ("Preliminary injunction pro.
ceeding.s are fraught with the risk of error•"),
" 2 Sec Canon Computer Sys., Inc. v. Nu-Kote Ina Inc., 134 F.3d 1085, 1088 (Fed. Cir.
1998) (holding that patents are entitled to a presumption of validity at the preliminary
injunction stage). The Federal Circuit made preliminary injunctions easier to obtain by
weakening the irreparable harm standard. Regional Circuits used to requite a showing of
validity and infringement "beyond question." The Federal Circuit now requires a "likeli-
hood" of validity and infringement for a preliminary injunction. SecJohn G. Mills & Louis
S. Zarfas, The Developing Standard for Irreparable Harm in Preliminary Injunctions to Prevent
Patent Infringement, 81 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK Orr. Soc'v 51. 55-56 (1999). The Federal
Circuit possibly counterbalances the weakened irreparable harm standard by insisting on a
strong showing of success on the merits. See e.g., Amazon.corn, 239 F.3d at 1347.
1 " Rule 65(a) gives judges discretion to grant a preliminary injunction. See Suntrust
Bank v. Houghton Mifflin Co„ 252 F.3d 1165, 1166 (11th Cir. 2001) (noting courts are free
to deny both preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in copyright cases to serve the
public interest); Vault Corp. V. Quaid Software Ltd., 655 F. Supp. 750, 757 (E.D. La. 1987),
aff'd, 847 F.2d 255 (5th Cir. 1988). If the balance of harm to the plaintiff and defendant is
about equal, then a trademark plaintiff must make a strong showing of likelihood of suc-
cess to get a preliminary injunction. Microstrategy, Inc. v. Motorola, Inc., 245 F.3d 335, 340
(4th Cir. 2001).
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a greater inclination to refuse preliminary injunctions in cases in
which the balance of hardships favors the defendants." 5 Furthermore,
judges should discourage opportunistic suits by denying preliminary
injunctions to plaintiffs who are not likely to enter the defendant's
market." 9
 Denial is appropriate because irreparable harm is un-
B. Declaratory judgment
Declaratory judgments are relatively difficult to get because
courts will not issue advisory opinions. To establish an actual contro-
versy that warrants a declaratory judgment, a party must show that it
has taken actions in preparation for possible infringing conduct and
that the IP owner has threatened the party with an infringement
suit. 119 The threat must create a reasonable apprehension of an in-
fringement suit. 119 Judges exercise substantial discretion regarding
whether they will accept a declaratory judgment suit; 129 that discretion
116 See Jaeger v. Am. Int'l Pictures. Inc., 330 F. Stipp. 274, 275 (S.D.N.I: 1971) (copy-
right suit); cf. Va. Carolina Tools, Inc. v. Int'l Tool Supply, Inc., 984 F.2d 113, 115 (4th Cir.
1993) (denial of preliminary injunction that might drive defendant to bankruptcy in law-
suit involving sale of business).
116
 "[Intel] is pushing for federal legislation that would prohibit companies from win-
ning an injunction unless they are actively pursuing the patented technology or could fill a
void if the defendant's product were pulled off the market." Sandburg, supra note 67.
117 See High Tech Med. Instrumentation, Inc. v. New Image Indus., Inc., 49 F.3d 1551,
1557 (Fed. Cir. 1995); cf. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co. v. Philips Petroleum Co., 835 F.2d
277, 278 (Fed. Cir. 1987) (staying a permanent injunction pending appeal because the
patent owner was planning to exit the market and licensed all comers), The risk that a
financially weak defendant is tillable to pay damages can be reduced by requiring the de-
fendant to post a bond. See Flo-Con Sys„ Inc. v. Leco Corp„ 845 F. Supp. 1576, 1583 (S.D.
Ga. 1993). A similar practice is used when permanent injunctions are stayed on appeal. Scc
Palm Ordered to Pay Bond in Patent Suit, CNET Ncws.com , Feb. 25, 2002, at http://news.
com.com/2100-1040-844863.1thul (explaining that district court judge declined to enjoin
Palm from selling infringing PDAs because plaintiff Xerox would not suffer irreparable
harm, but required Palm to post a bond to cover damages in case their appeal failed). Of
course, the bond itself could impose a burden on the defendant.
"6 See Diagnostic Unit Inmate Council v. Films Inc., 88 F.3d 651, 653 (8th Cir. 1996);
Sherwood Med. Indus., Inc. v. Deknatel, Inc., 512 F.2d 724, 727 (8th Cir. 1975); Bryan
Ashley Intl, Inc. v. Shelby Williams Indus., 932 F. Supp, 290, 291-92 (S.D. Fla. 1996);
WRIGHT ET AL„ supra note 103, §2761, at 597 (noting that the same principles apply to
patent, trademark, and copyright declaratory judgment suits).
119 See Shell Oil Co.'v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
12° Seell'ihon v. Seven Falls Co., 515 U.S. 277, 287 (1995) (stating district courts have a
"unique breadth of ... discretion to decline to enter a declaratory judgment"); EMC Corp.
v. Norand Corp.. 89 F.3d 807, 810 (Fed. Cir. 1996).
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is reflected in the variable and fact-intensive treatment of the reason-
able apprehension requirement."'
Declaratory judgments of noninfringement or invalidity help
mitigate the harm from opportunistic and anti-competitive IP litiga-
(1010 22 If an IP owner threatens a supplier or its customers, then the
supplier can respond quickly by filing a declaratory judgment suit in-
stead of waiting to respond to an infringement suit that could be stra-
tegically delayed. 123 Appropriately, the IP owner's litigiousness is a fac-
tor favoring the apprehension of lawsuit and standing to file a
declaratory judgment. 124 Declaratory judgment also helps potential
defendants to organize and share the cost of challenging the validity
of a patent. 125 Opportunistic patent plaintiffs may threaten weaker
121 SCE KIMBERLY PACE MOORE ET AL., PATENT LITIGAMON AND STRATEGY 29 (1999).
122 The patent owner win rates at jury trials are 68% when the patent owner initiates
the suit but only 38% when the alleged infringer initiates the suit. See Kimberly A. Moore.
Judges. Juries and Patent Cases: An Empirical Peck Inside the Black Box, 99 Mtual. L. REV. 365,
368 (2000). Declaratory judgment suits are a useful tactic for blunting the threat of anti-
competitive litigation by an exclusive patent licensee. The Wisconsin Alumni Research
Foundation (WARF) holds patents on different types of human stem cells. WARF gave an
exclusive license to Geron covering a subset of the patented stem cells. WARE sued Geron
seeking a declaratory judgment that Geron failed to exercise its option under its exclusive
license to include additional cell types within the license. \YAM' fears that Geron will inter-
fere with future licenses between WARF and third parties. Sec Tim Adams, Stem Cell Lawsuit
Heats Up, BIOTECHNOLOGY NEWsWA'ICiI 5, Oct. 1, 2001, available at 2001 WI. 8787971;
University Affiliate Sues Biotech Firm Over Licensing of New Stem Cell Types, PHARMACEU'EICAL L.
PoCv REP. (BNA) No. 7 (Aug. 23, 2001); US Patent 6.200.806 Could be Gatekeeper to Fur-
ther Stem Cell Research, UVENTURES.COM , Nov. 2, 2001, at
http://www.tiventures.com/servlets/UVTechNews/3071 . For an example of a declaratory
judgment suit used against an allegedly opportunistic patent snit. see Brenda Sandberg,
yahoo-NCR Patent Dispute Heats Up, THE RECORDER, Dec. 30, 2002, at http://www.law.com .
12) See Windmoller v. Laguerre, 284 F. Stipp, 563, 565 (D.D.C. 1968) (stating that de-
claratory judgment serves "the public's interest in certainty and prompt decision, particu-
larly where potential competition may well be suppressed unnecessarily through the use of
questionable patents"); Wttunrr ur AL.. supra note 103. § 2761, at 575. Delay by the IP
owner is limited by the !aches doctrine.
124 Seew. Interactive Corp. v. First Data Res.. Inc., 972 F.2d 1295. 1298 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
125 It is difficult to overcome collective action problems and organize private parties to
share the cost of invalidating a patent, but it does happen. See Nat'l Hairdressers' & Cos-
metologists' Ass'n v. Philad Co., 4 F.R.D. 106, 107 (D. Del. 1944) (addressing case where
association sued for declaratory judgment of patent invalidity after patent owner sued or
threatened to site many of the association's members); SHULMAN, supra note 29, at 55-57
(noting that a consortium of medical groups has offered to share the costs of' the litigation
with Kaiser-Permanente as Kaiser attempts to invalidate a gene patent); Frazier, supra note
50 (explaining that a small web-based merchant has organized similar merchants to fight a
patent lawsuit he sees as an "extortion scant;" he set up a web site for defendants-
www.youmaybenext.com—to organize the fight against the patent owner); John Markoff,
Patent Claim Strikes an Electronics Nerve, NA'. TIMES, July 29, 2002, at C4, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/29/technology/29JPEG.html  (revealing that Members
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defendants first to get quick licenses that create the impression that
they have a strong case. 126 Finally, declaratory judgment gives an al-
leged infringer some leeway to choose the forum for a suit. 127 Forum
choice may reduce the credibility of a weak lawsuit; empirical evi-
dence shows that the choice of forum has a significant impact on trial
outcome. 128
C. Summary Judgment for the Defendant
Summary judgment law and substantive IP law interact in ways
that can promote or discourage socially harmful IP litigation. 129
Summary judgment for the defendant is difficult to achieve when the
substantive law sets standards for IP protection that are easy for a
plaintiff to meet or that call for careful balancing of context-sensitive
criteria. For example, the standard for trademark infringement asks
whether the defendant's behavior creates a likelihood of confusion in
the minds of consumers. Courts have identified as many as nine fac-
tors that must be evaluated to determine confusion.'" With so many
factors that must be balanced, it is easy for a plaintiff to present a case
that gets past summary judgment. 131 Furthermore, summary judg-
ment on a fact-intensive question may be delayed until time-
consuming and expensive discovery is completed. Avoidance of so-
of the Joint Photographic Experts Group. creators of the JPEG standard for video com-
pression, said they would were assembling information that would invalidate a patent that
covers aspects of JPEG.); Brenda Sandburg, Netscape, Alicrosoft Than Up in Internet Suit, Tit E
RECORDER, Apr. 2, 2002, at hup://www.lawcom (explaining that Microsoft and Netscape
are working together to get a declaratory judgment of patent invalidity against a patent
owner who contends his patents cover accessing information over the Internet).
126 Acceptance of licenses is a secondary consideration pointing toward nonobvions-
ness and validity of a patent. See Stratollex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1539
(Fed. Cir. 1983).
127 Even though the choice of forum is fairly restricted by venue considerations, de-
claratory judgment gives a substantial forum selection advantage to an accused infringer.
See Kimberly A. Moore, Forum Shopping in Patent Cases: Does Geographic Choice Affect Innova-
tion?, 79 N.C. L. Rcv. 889, 907-20 (2001).
' 28 See Kimberly A. Moore, Jury Demands: Who's Asking?, 17 BERKELEY Tcen. LT 847,
860-62 (2002) (attributing a portion of the Unproved win rates of plaintiffs in declaratory
judgment actions to forum selection).
12'6
	
generally Bone, supra note 16, at 520-22 (describing summary judgment and
other procedural reforms motivated by worries about frivolous suits); Samuel Issacharoff &
George Loewenstein, Second Thoughts About Summary Judgment, 100 YALE L.J. 73 (1990).
IN See 3 J. THOMAS MCCARTHY, MCCARTHY ON TRADEMARKS AND UNFAIR COMPETI-
TION § 23:19 (1996).
tst See Bone, supra note 16, at 567 ("(Pjlaintiffs are often able to put off summary
judgment by filing affidavits attesting to the need for discovery.").
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cially harmful litigation requires quick and cheap summary judgment.
Therefore, a fact-intensive standard for IP protection or infringement
is a poor candidate for stmmtary judgment." 2
Recently, courts have shown greater sensitivity to the desirability
of giving defendants a chance to extricate themselves from opportun-
istic or anti-competitive litigation through summary judgment)" The
Supreme Court took an important step to mitigate harm caused by
trade dress infringement suits in Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Samara Broth-
ers, Inc." 4 The plaintiff, Samara, claimed trademark protection based
on its design of a line of children's clothing) 35 Trade dress (or any
other mark) must be distinctive to qualify for trademark protection)"
A plaintiff can show that. a word or product packaging is either inher-
ently distinctive or has acquired distinctiveness through usage ("sec-
ondary meaning" in trademark jargon)) 37 The Supreme Court. re-
jected Samara's argument that its clothing was inherently distinc-
tive)" The Court insisted that a putative owner of a trademark in the
design or configuration of a product show that the trade dress has
acquired secondary meaning)" The Court explained the require-
ment of secondary meaning with the observation: "Competition is
deterred . . . not merely by successful suit but by the plausible threat.
132
 See Rockwell Graphic Sys., Inc. v. DEV Indus., Inc., 925 F.2d 174, 179 (7th Cir. 1991)
(holding that "only in an extreme case can what. is a 'reasonable' precaution be deter-
mined on a motion for summary judgment, because the answer depends on a balancing of
costs and benefits that will vary from case to case"); McCARTuv. supra note 130. § 32:120
(explaining that summary judgment for defendant on likelihood of confusion is difficult
in trademark cases unless the defendant's product is totally unrelated or the mark was
totally dissimilar); WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 103, § 2732.1, at 143.
'" See Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986) ("One of the principal
purposes of the summary judgment rule is to isolate and dispose of factually unsupported
claims or defenses, and we think it should be interpreted in a way that allows it to accom-
plish this purpose."); Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586
(1986); Bone. supra note 16, at 593-96 (stating that judicial screening based on early
summary judgment combined with targeted discovery is the best method of controlling
frivolous litigation).
134 529 U.S. 205 (2000).
1 " Id. at 207-08.
136 See id. at 209-11.
1 " A trademark owner must show that a product design has been used in such a way
that the public comes to recognize the design as an indicator of origin. See id. at 210-11.
Secondary meaning can lie proven with consumer surveys or by showing significant adver-
tising and sales. See id.
13a See id. at 212. The Supreme Court considered a more fact-intensive standard of dis-
tinctiveness and rejected it, stating. "Such a test would rarely provide the basis for sum-
mary disposition of an anti-competitive strike suit." See id. at 214. The Court also placed
the burden on the plaintiff of showing that the trade dress is not functional. Sec id.
139 See Wai-Mart, 529 U.S. at 214.
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of successful suit, and given the unlikelihood of inherently source-
identifying design, the game of allowing suit based upon alleged in-
herent distinctiveness seems to us not worth the candle. "HO
Recent cases demonstrate the impact of Wal-Mart on summary
judgment for defendants in trade dress infringement cases. In Yankee
Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 141
 the defendant won on summary
judgment despite copying"2 elements of the plaintiff's design because
the plaintiff made no showing of secondary meaning." 3 The plaintiff,
Yankee, claimed trade dress protection in a combination of candle
shapes and sizes, labels, display method, catalog layout, and the quan-
tities of candles sold as a unit.t44 The Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit placed this trade dress in the product design/configuration
category and not the packaging category; thus, Wal-Mart applied and
secondary meaning was required."5
Yankee also claimed infringement of its copyright on the labels of
nine scented candles. 146 The court granted summary judgment for
the defendant after applying the merger doctrine because no reason-
able juror could find substantial similarity." 7 The Yankee Candle deci-
sion is representative of the greater receptiveness courts now show to
summary judgment in favor of " defendants in copyright cases.tm 48
Stricter application of the requirement of originality and more careful
filtration of unprotectable subject matter have modestly increased the
burden on copyright plaintiffs and made summary judgment for de-
fendants more likely. Nevertheless, defendants still have a hard time
getting a summary judgment victory because plaintiffs can easily make
a prima facie case of copying.
140
"1 259 F.3d 25 (1st Cir. 2001).
142 After Wal-Mart, intentional copying plays a minor role in establishing secondary
meaning in design/configuration cases. Id. at 44-45.
143 Id. at 43-45. Similarly, the Kohler Co. was stied for trade dress infringement be-
cause it copied the unpatented design of a faucet. I.P. Lund Trading ApS v. Kohler Co.,
118 F. Supp. 2d 92, 94 (D. Mass. 2000). Kohler won summary judgment because the plain-
tiff made no showing of secondary meaning in the faucet design. Id. at 100, 103.
114
 Yankee Candle, 259 F.3d at 39-90.
145 Id. at 40. Following Wal-Mart, the First Circuit resolves uncertainty by placing trade
dress in the design/configuration category. Id.
144
 Id. at 32.
147 Id. at 32-33.
145 See COHEN rr	 supra note 63, at 173 ("S) intimacy judgment in copyright cases
has traditionally been discouraged. Nevertheless, courts are more frequently employing it
as a means to weed out claims that lack merit.").
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Infringement of the reproduction right requires proof of copy-
*, as opposed to independent. creation. Copying can be proved di-
.
reedy but is usually proved using circumstantial evidence. Circumstan-
tial proof of copying requires a showing of access and similarity. The
Second Circuit in Arnsteht v, Porter149 set up a sliding scale for evaluat,
ing these factors: if there is no similarity, then access is irrelevant; if
there is no access shown, then the similarity must be so striking to
preclude the possibility of independent creation: 150 if there is evi-
dence of access and similarity, then the trier of fact decides whether
copying occurred."' When the court must balance factors like access
and similarity, it is hard for a defendant to win summary judgment
even though she knows she created the work independently. 152 Iu Ara-
skin, the plaintiff claimed that various musical compositions were cop-
ied by the defendant, Cole Porter.'" Although one song sold over a
million copies, the second sold only about 2000 copies and the third
was not published but had been performed over the radio)" The
plaintiff also claimed that someone stole a copy of the compositions
from his rooin."5 The trial court decided for the defendant on sum-
mary judgment.'" The Second Circuit reversed. 157 The court found
enough similarity and access to raise a factual question.'" The court
emphasized that issues of credibility created by the plaintiffs allega-
tions must be evaluated by the jury.159
Defendants cannot be certain to escape trial and ultimate liability
even when they have documented their independent creation. Proof
of widespread dissemination coupled with a theory of subconscious
149 154 F.2d 464, 475 (2d Cir. 1946) (refusing to grant summary judgment for a defen-
dant even though the evidence of access and similarity were both weak).
Is° Id. at 468. But see Selle v. Gibb, 741 F.2d 896, 905 (7th Cir. 1984) (affirming j.n.o.v.
for the defendant, despite striking similarities, because the plaintiff did not make a
threshold showing of access).
151 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 468.
152 See supra note 123.
153 Arnstein, 154 F.2d at 469.
154 See id.
I" See id.
156 Id. at 468.
157 Id. at 475.
158 A rnson, 154 F.2d at 475.
159 Sec id. at 471. The court also noted that a jury could possibly also find an unlawful
appropriation because the similarities between the compositions were not merely trifling.
See id. The dissent approved of summary judgment because the works lacked appreciable
similarity. Sec id. at 476 (Clark, J., dissenting). The only similarity was small detached and
insignificant portions. Sec id. (Clark, J., dissenting).
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copying is enough to win a music copyright infringement claim."'
Defendants are vulnerable to copyright infringement suits even .
though their connection to the plaintiff is tenuous and their access to
the plaintiff's work is entirely conjectura1. 161
Defendants have had some success winning summary judgment
in cases involving art reproductions. In these cases, the plaintiff makes
a derivative work and the defendant makes a similar work based either
on the plaintiffs work or on the original that inspired the plaintiff.
Rather than pressing the argument for independent creation, defen-
dants have succeeded at summary judgment by arguing the plaintiff's
work is not copyrightable because it lacks originality. For example, in
L. Bailin & Sou v. Snyder the plaintiff made a plastic Uncle Sam bank
based on a cast iron bank in the public domain. 162
 The plaintiff used
the metal bank for a sketch and a clay mode1. 168
 The plastic version
had small differences from the original.'" Because the differences
were dictated by functional considerations or did not amount to
significant alterations, the originality requirement was not satisfied. 165
In patent law, the Federal Circuit has pushed two doctrinal posi-
tions that make summary judgment easier for defendants. First, the
court has characterized patent claim construction as a question of law
and encouraged pre-trial "Markman hearings" to construe the scope
166 See Three Boys Music Corp. v. Bolton, 212 F.3(1 477, 482 (9th Cir. 2000); Bright
Tunes Music Corp. v. Harrisongs Music, Ltd., 420 F. Stipp. 177, 180 (D.C.N.Y 1976)
(George Harrison found to have subconsciously copied "He's So Fine" in "My Sweet
Lord").
161 Sec Bouchat v. Baltimore Ravens. Inc., 241 F.3d 350, 355-56 (4th Cir. 2000) (finding
that submission of a logo to the Ravens organization was enough to establish access and
support an infringement verdict); Ty. Inc. v. GMA Accessories, Inc„ 132 F.3d 1167, 1171
(7th Cir. 1997) (finding that access and copying may be inferred when two works resemble
each other and nothing in the public domain).
' 62 536 F.2d 186, 488 (2(1 Cir. 1976) (en bane).
165 Id.
164
 Many of the differences were not perceptible to the casual observer, and the work
took less than two days to make. A smaller base was two inches shorter, the umbrella was
pressed against his leg (to allow a one-piece mold for easier manufacturing), the eagle
clutched leaves instead of arrows, and the shape and texture of the hat and the shape of
the carpet bag was changed. See id.
166 See id. at 492. A similar outcome is found in Pickett u Prince, 207 F.3d 402, 406 (7th
Cir. 2000) ("Concentrating the right to make derivative works in the owner of the original
work prevents what might otherwise be an endless series of infringement suits posing in-
soluble difficulties of proof."), and Entertainment Research Group. Inc. v. Genesis Creative
Group. Inc., 122 F.3d 1211, 1221 (9th Cir. 1997) (affirming summary judgment for the de-
fendant on the grounds that an inflatable Toucan Sam costume derived from a copy-
righted image was not copyrightable because it did not have sufficient originality).
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of patent dab-m. 1 °6 Defendants have an opportunity to win summary
judgment. on infringement if they succeed in persuading the court to
adopt a narrow claim construction. 167 Second, the court has reduced
the role of the doctrine of eqttivalents. 168 Even though it has an equi-
table origin, this doctrine allows a fact-finder to expand the literal
scope of a patent claim to encompass accused processes and devices
that depart from the claimed invention by making small changes from
the claimed invention. In Festo onp. rr. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki
Co., (he Federal Circuit. fashioned an absolute bar against. use of the
doctrine of equivalents to expand claim limitations that were the sub-
ject of narrowing amendments during prosecution history. 169 That
decision pleased big patent. owners like IBM, which filed an an -netts
brief asking the Supreme Court to uphold the Federal Circuit deci-
sion. 170 The industry amici believed that restricting the scope of the
doctrine of equivalents would help control opportunistic patent
suits."' The Supreme Court rejected the absolute bar but certainly
expressed sympathy for the Federal Circuit's goal of increasing the
clarity of the property rights defined by patent claims."2
HI. POST-TRIAL CONTROL OF SOCIALLY HARMFUL IP LITIGATION
A. Fee Shifting and Attorney Sanctions
The copyright, trademark, and patent statutes all have provisions
that authorize fee shifting, which allows judges to punish plaintiffs for
conducting opportunistic or anti-competitive litigation.'" The Lan-
ham Act provides that "in exceptional cases" a district "court may
168 See NlooRE El' AL., S Pra note 121, at 192 (describing how some courts resolve pat-
ent claim construction on a summary judgment motion near the end of discovery).
107 Sec id.
133 The all-element rule allows a defendant to obtain summary judgment on patent in-
fringement under the doctrine of equivalents if one of the claimed elements is missing
from the alleged infringing device. See \VaruerJenkinson Co. v. Hilton Davis Chem. Co.,
520 U.S. 17. 29-30 (1997).
100 See 234 F.3d 558, 564-66 (Fed. Cir. 2000), rtv'd 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
170 SeeSandburg, supra note 67.
"'See id.
"? See Festo Corp. v. Shoketsu Kinzoku Kogyo Kabushiki Co., 535 U.S. 722 (2002).
"3 See Lawrence C. Marshall et al., The Use and Impact of Rule II, 86 Nw. U. L. REV. 943,
953 (1992) (reporting survey showing Rule 11 sanctions most often arise because of alleg-
edly frivolous suits). For applications to patent cases, see generally Antonious v. Spalding Co'
Evenflo Cos., Inc., 275 F.3d 1066 (Fed. Cir. 2002), and Special Devices. Inc. v. OEA, Inc., 269
F.3d 1340 (Fed. Cir, 2001),
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award reasonable attorney's fees to the prevailing party." 174 Similarly,
the Patent Act allows fee shilling in exceptional cases. Exceptional
cases include those involving frivolous suits, inequitable conduct be-
fore the Patent and Trademark Office, and misconduct during litiga-
tion. 175 The copyright standard is more flexible: a district "court in its
discretion may allow the recovery of full costs by or against any party
[T]he court may also award a reasonable attorney's fee to the
prevailing party as part of the costs." 176 Fee shifting usually benefits
plaintiffs in IP cases, especially when defendants are willful infringers,
but. defendants may also win fees from plaintiffs.'" A defendant can
win fees in a copyright case when a plaintiff brings "a weak, if non-
frivolous, case and ... argue[s] for an unreasonable extension of
copyright protection."' 78 The goal of fee shifting is both compensa-
tion to the prevailing party and deterrence of opportunistic and anti-
competitive suits. 179
174 15 U.S.C. § 1117(a) (2000) (Lanham Act §35(a)). Awarding attorney's fees in
trademark cases is governed by the Lanham Act. "Section 35(a) of the Lanham Act, which
lists the remedies available for trademark violations, provides in pertinent part that 'Wile
court in exceptional cases may award reasonable attorney fees to the prevailing party.'"
Securacomm Consulting, Inc. v. Securacom, Inc., 224 F.3d 273, 279 (3d Cir. 2000) (citing
15 U.S.C. § 1117(a)).
"5 See S Indus., Inc. v. Centra 2000, Inc., 249 F.3d 625, 629 (7th Cir. 2001) (affirming
award of attorney's fees to defendant because trademark claims were meritless and be-
cause of dilatory tactics); Beckman Instruments, Inc. v. LKB Produkter AB, 892 F,2d 1547,
1551 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (citing 35 U.S.C.A. § 285).
176 17 U.S.C. § 505 (2000). Prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants must be
treated alike for purposes of awarding attorney's fees under the Copyright Act, with attor-
ney's fees awarded to prevailing parties only as a matter of the court's discretion. The
Copyright Act attorney fee provision gives no hint that successful plaintiffs are to be
treated differently than successful defendants. Sec Fogerty v. Fantasy Inc., 510 U.S. 517, 534
(1994) (citing 17 U.S.C. § 505).
177 See PS Promotions, Inc. v. Stern, No. 97 C 3742, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3096, at *1-2
(N.D. Ill. Mar. 22, 2001) (denying attorney's fees to defendant under the Lanham Act but
allowing an award under 28 U.S.C. § 1927. which authorizes such an award against an at-
torney who "multiplies the proceedings in any case unreasonably and vexatiously"); Lem-
ley, supra note 29, at 1530 (difficult for a patent defendant to win attorney's fees).
175 Matthews v. Freedman, 157 F.3d 25, 29 (1st Cir. 1998) (citing Fogerty, 510 U.S. at
526-27, and Edwards v. Red Farm Studio Co., 109 F.3d 80, 82-83 (1st Cir. 1997)); sec also
Fogerty, 510 U.S. at 534-35 (reversing practice that limited the award of attorney's fees to
cases in which the plaintiffs lawsuit was frivolous or brought in bad faith); Fantasy, Inc. v,
Fogerty, 94 F.3d 553, 555 (9111 Cir. 1996) (finding that an award of attorney's fees to a
copyright defendant is permissible even if the plaintiff brought the lawsuit in good faith;
the award is justified if the defendant furthers the purpose of the Copyright Act).
179 Nonexclusive factors the court is to consider in determining whether to award pre-
vailing party attorney fees under Copyright Act Include frivolousness, motivation, objec-
tive unreasonableness (both in factual and in legal components of case) and the need in
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Fee shifting deters opportunistic suits by raising the expected
cost of weak lawsuits and undermining the credibility of the plaintiff's
threat to go to trial.m One type of opportunistic lawsuit is credible
because the plaintiff fails to investigate. Sensibly, failure to investigate
triggers fee shifting and attorney sanctions; thus, deterrence of such
behavior is likely to be effective.isi A second type of opportunistic law-
suit is credible because of the risk of judicial error. 182 Assuming even
the most error-prone court gets the decision right most of the dme,
fee shifting raises expected legal costs to an opportunistic plaintiff
and makes an opportunistic lawsuit less credible. 183
Fee shifting is probably less effective in controlling anti-
competitive litigation. The most aggressive predatory litigation strives
to choke off financial resources from the defendant. 184 The prospect
of recovering attorney's fees after trial has no value to a defendant
who goes bankrupt before trial, and perhaps little value to a defen-
particular circumstances to advance considerations of compensation and deterrence."
Lieb v, Topstone Indus., 788 F.2d 151, 156 (3d Cir. 1986).
180
 Sec Lucian Arey Bebchuk & Howard F. Chang, An Analysis of Fee Shifting Based on the
Margin of Victory: On Frivolous Suits, Meritorious Suits, and the Role of Rule 11, 25 J. LEGAL
STUD. 371, 372 (1996) (explaining that Rule 11 could be used to implement a scheme in
which attorney's fees would be rewarded when the margin of victory is sufficiently large);
A. Mitchell Polinsky & Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Sanctioning Frivolous Suits: An Economic Analysis,
82 GEo. Ld. 397, 404-06 (1993). But see Meurer, supra note 24, at 87-89 (showing the Brit-
ish rule is not guaranteed to achieve a tower probability of patent litigation than the
American rule). Two drawbacks to fee shifting are the risk of error and the cost of satellite
litigation over fees. See Bone, SUP1V note 16, at 589-90.
u"Sce Brasseler, U.S.A. I L.P. v. Stryker Sales Corp., 267 F.3d 1370, 1386 (Fed. Cir.
2001) (finding that the plaintiff was required to pay attorney's fees to defendant in a pat-
ent infringement action because plaintiff's attorneys failed to investigate after receiving
notice of on-sale bar); Ferraris Med., Inc., v. Azimuth Corp., No. 99.66-M, 2002 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 13589, at *7 (D.N.H. July 24, 2002) (holding that trade dress infringement plaintiff
was forced to pay the defendant's attorney's fees because of failure to investigate).
185 See supra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
183
 In the third type of opportunistic suit, plaintiffs with weak claims pretend to have
strong claims but the strength of the claims is unknown to defendants without extensive
discovery or perhaps trial. The credibility of these types of suits is sometimes weakened by
fee shifting and sometimes unaffected, depending on the circumstances. See Meurer, supra
note 24, at 84; Eric Talley, Liability Based Fee-Shifting Rules and Settlement Mechanisms Under
Incomplete Information, 71 Citt.-RENT L. REV. 461, 495 (1995) (stating British rule would not
reduce litigation).
184 Nevertheless, a defendant that withstands predator) , litigation should certainly be
entitled to fee shifting. See Seen racomm Consulting, 224 F.3d at 282. In Sccuracomm Consulting,
the defendant's vexatious litigation tactics, consisting of deliberate effort to "bury" the
plaintiff financially and "take everything he had," rendered the case sufficiently excep-
tional to support an award of attorney's fees to the prevailing plaintiff in a trademark in-
fringement suit, even though the infringement was not willful and the court could have
chosen other avenues to sanction improper litigation behavior. Id.
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slant who suffers financial distress because of trial cost and delay. It
could be a more effective deterrent to anti-competitive litigation that
attempts to discourage a defendant from making a certain product
variety. The possibility of recovering attorney's fees would encourage
some marginal defendants to fight the predator and reduce the
credibility of predatory litigation. 185
B. Sham Litigation and Antitrust Law
Antitrust law provides a potentially powerful means of controlling
socially harmful IP litigation.' Certain anti-competitive litigation vio-
lates Section 2 of the Sherman ActI 87 tinder two related theories.'
One theory originated in Walker Process Equipment, Inc. v. Food Machin-
ery & Chemical Cotp. 189
 and applies only to patent infringement suits.
The antitrust claimant must show that the patentee got its patent by
committing conunon law fraud on the PTO, and that the patent
would not have issued but for the fraud. 19° The other theory applies
to sham litigation, including sham IP litigation, 01 and is based on a
"a See Ferraris, 2002 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 13589. at *11-12 (addressing frivolous copyright
and trade dress infringement claims); Yankee Candle Co. v. Bridgewater Candle Co., 140 F.
Stipp. 2d Ill, 119 (D. Mass. 2001) (stating, in a copyright and trade dress infringement
case, that the $1 million fee "award should also serve to deter Yankee Candle and other
market leaders from bringing overly aggressive and meridess suits against their smaller
competitors.").
186
 For a helpful overview, see generally Myers. supra note 29.
187
 The Section 2 requirements for monopolization are "(1) possession of monopoly in
the relevant market and (2) the willful acquisition or maintenance of that power as distill•
guished from growth or development as a consequence of a superior product, business
acumen, or historic accident." Myers, supra note 29, at 578.
188
 If the litigation involves concerted exclusionary behavior by two or more competi-
tors, it may violate [SI ection I of the Sherman Act as well." See Myers supra note 29. at 578.
Predatory litigation can also violate Section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act for
being unfair trade practice. id.
1139 382 U.S. 172 (1965).
190 Id. at 173. The nature of this fraud is not clear. Compare Nobelpharma AB v. Implant
Innovations, 141 F.3d 1059, 1071 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (noting that conduct that gives rise to
Walker Process fraud is more 'serious than conduct that give rise to inequitable conduct li-
ability), with Mark D. Janis, Transitions in IP and Antitrust, 47 ANTrmusT Butt. - 253, 274
(2002) (questioning whether the distinction between fraud on the PTO and inequitable
conduct in Nobelphantra will have a significant impact).
191 See Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc„ 743 F.2d 1282, 1284 (9th Cir. 1984). Sham liti-
gation antitrust suits have been filed against the party claiming infringement in many types
of cases. See, e.g., CVD v Raytheon Co„ 769 F.2d 842 (1st Cir. 1985) (trade secret); Bruns-
wick v. Riegel Textile Corp., 752 F.2d 261 (7th Cir. 1984) (patent); PrimeTitne 24 Joint
Venture v. NBC, Inc„ 21 F. Stipp. 2d 350, 359 (S.D.N.Y 1998) (copyright); Letica Corp. v.
Sweetheart Cup Co., 790 F. Stipp. 702 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (trademark); Christianson v. Colt
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showing that the antitrust defendant. (IP plaintiff) knew that objec-
tively there was no basis for the infringement claim. 192 Under either
theory, the antitrust plaintiff must prove it suffered an antitrust in-
jury, and must also show that the IP litigation created or sustained a
monopoly in the relevant market.I 93
Trebled antitrust damages are a potent deterrent of anti-
competitive activity; but in practice antitrust does little to control so-
cially harmful IP litigation because its reach is very limited; it does not.
apply to opportunistic litigation and applies only to a subset of anti-
competitive litigation. Antitrust law does not reach opportunistic liti-
gation because the purpose of such litigation is to extract a settlement.
payment, not to exclude a rival. In antitrust parlance, there is no anti-
trust injury and no attempt to monopolize a market. The sham litiga-
tion theory applies to lawsuits that have an anti-competitive effect be-
cause of the cost and delay created by the litigation; it does not apply
to lawsuits that have an anti-competitive effect because a plaintiff suc-
ceeds in enforcing a weak 1P right. 194 The Walker Process theory has
limited utility because it is difficult to prove fraudulent patent pro-
Indus. Operating Corp., 766 F. Stipp. 670 (C.D. 111. 1991) (trade secret); G. Heilman Brew-
ing Co., Inc. v. Anheuser-Busch Inc., 676 F. Stipp. 1436 (E.D. Wisc. 1987) (trademark).
192 See Prof. Real Estate Investors, Inc. v, Columbia Pictures, 508 U.S. 49, 51-52 (1993)
(claiming that renting movies to hotel guests to watch in their rooms infringes the public
performance right); id. at 64 (explaining that the lawsuit was not objectively baseless even
though the copyright owner lost a summary judgment motion).
193 See supra notes 174-177. Attempts to monopolize are also actionable.
194 The Noeri,Pennington doctrine holds that petitioning the government to receive
benefits at the expense of a competitor is protected speech and therefore immune from
antitrust scrutiny. See United Mine Workers v. Pennington, 381 U.S. 657, 671-72 (1965); E.
R.R. v. Noerr Motor Freight, 365 U.S. 127, 135-37, 145 (1961). In this context, petitioning
includes litigation as well as lobbying. Sec Ca. Motor Tramp. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited,
404 U.S. 508, 510 (1972). Noerr-Pennington antitrust immunity does not extend to sham
litigation. Sham litigation is defined in terms of the objective of the litigation.
The 'sham" exception to Noerr encompasses situations in which persons use
the governmental process—as opposed to the outcome of that process—as an
anticompetitive weapon. A classic example is the filing of frivolous objections
to the license application of a competitor, with no expectation of achieving
denial of the license but simply in order to impose expense and delay.
City of Columbia v. Omni Outdoor Adver., 499 U.S. 365. 380 (1991); see Grip-Pak, Inc. v. Ill.
Tool Works, 694 F.2d 466, 472 (7th Cir. 1982) (asking whether a lawsuit can be justified
based on likely remedies rather than being profitable because of the cost of the lawsuit to a
competitor); see also HEuncuT HovENKAmP E1 AL., IP AND ANIMUS-I: AN ANALYSIS OF
AN'ITIMUST PRINCIPLES APPLIED TO INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW § 11.3, at 11-26 (2003)
("Some courts have held that Noerr immunity either does not apply or is easier to over-
come where the intellectual property owner is accused of filing a pattern of suits, rather
than just one.").
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curetnent. 195
 Where Section 2 applies, it probably deters the most
egregious lawsuits in which a monopolist gets a flimsy patent and liti-
gates an entrant out of existence, but it does not have much effect
otherwise. Section 2 claims based on sham litigation are very com,
mon 196 but almost never successful. 197
IV. SCREENING OUT WEAK INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWSUITS
A. Better Examination at tlte Patent and Trademark Office
Better screening of putative IP rights at an early stage would cer-
tainly help mitigate the problems of opportunistic and anti-
competitive lawsuits, but there is little hope for this method of con-
trol. Copyright and trade secret rights are not subjected to any ex-
amination; copyright has a minimal registration procedure. Thus,
there is no opportunity to use agency resources to screen out weak
copyright and trade secret claims. The PTO examines patents and
trademarks, and could do a better job of screening out weak claims,
but various factors limit the performance of the agency. 198 A funda-
mental limitation on trademark examination is that plaintiffs can pro-
tect even unregistered marks under federal law. 199
The ex parte nature of examination restricts the information
available to examiners and poses the chief obstacle to high quality ex-
I% See generally ithlker Process, 382 U.S. 172.
196 See HOVENKANIP ET AL., supra note 194, § 11.1, at 11-2 (anti-competitive litigation
was the subject of more than 100 reported decisions from 1993 to 2000); Myers, supra note
29, at 565 (increased volume of sham litigation).
197 Section 2 liability requires clear and convincing evidence of a bad faith patent suit,
specific intent to monopolize the relevant market, and a dangerous probability of success.
See Handgards, 601 F.2d at 994-96. Ethicon was held liable for an antitrust violation for
bringing the infringement claim in bad faith. Id. at 991; sec also HOVENKAMP ET AL., supra
note 194, § 5.4, at 511 (explaining that courts carefully scrutinize antitrust claims based
on sham IP litigation); id. § 11.2, at 11-14 (stating that both Walker Process and Handgards
suits usually fail); Nissen. supra note 22, at 66 ("[T1he odds of prevailing on an antitrust
claim [based on a frivolous patent infringement suit] are not good.'). Instead of a federal
antitrust claim, victims of anti-competitive suits might prevail using a state law cause of
action. See Nissen, supra note 22, at 66-67 (explaining the availability of a state unfair corer
petition law cause of action against a party who brings a bad faith patent infringement
claim).
198 See Lemley, supra note 29, at 1495 (noting criticism of PTO for failing to effectively
examine business method patents); Michael J. Meurer, Business nIkthod Patents and Patent
Floods, 8 WASH. U. J.L. & PoL'Y 309, 310 (2002); Rai, supra note 98, at 203 (claiming that
there is a flood of low quality gene patents).
1 i9 See Two Pesos, Inc. v. Taco Cabana, Inc., 505 U.S. 763. 776 (1992) (finding in-
fringement in case involving unregistered trade dress).
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amination at the PT0. 2°° Patent applicants and their attorneys have a
duty to disclose information relevant to patentability. A patent owner
risks facing a defense of inequitable conduct, which leaves a patent
unenforceable if the owner was not candid with the PTO. Despite
these incentives, critics charge that many patents are granted that
would not have been granted if the PTO had better information."'
Examination also suffers from three other problems. First, exam-
iners have a financial incentive to process applications quickly. 202 The
patent prosecution process moves so quickly that the average patent
gets only eighteen hours of review. 203 Second, opening new fields to
patentable subject matter has resulted in low patent quality because
the prior art needed to examine an application is not available, and
third, finding trained examiners in a new field is difficult. These prob-
lems are acute in the fields of software and business methods. 204 Some
of these problems could be cured by increasing the resources avail-
able to the PT0,2°3 but there is a strong argument to limit the re-
sources spent on examination: most patents and many registered
trademarks have little or no value, and therefore a thorough examina-
tion of every application would be wasteful. 20°
B. Strider Standards for Certain. Intellectual Property Rights
Examination and pre- and post-trial control measures are not al-
ways sufficient to control opportunistic and anti-competitive litigation
200 See Lemley, supra note 29. at 1500 (noting that applicants are not obliged to search
for prior art).
261 See SHULMAN, 511Pra note 29, at 59-60, 69 (noting that Compton won a controversial
patent on search technology that is a basic feature of multimedia databases; the PTO reex-
amined the Compton patent on its own initiative and invalidated all of the claims); John R.
Thomas, Collusion and C011ective Action in the Patent System: A Proposal for Patent Bounties, 2001
U. ILL. L. Rua'. 305. 313-15 (potential inequitable conduct liability is not sufficient to in-
duce candid disclosure to the PTO).
202 SeeRni, supra note 98, at 2] 8.
200 See Lemley, supra note 29, at 1500.
204 Seejulie E. Cohen & Mark A. Lemley, Patent Scope C.9" Innovation in the Software Indus-
try, 89 CAL. L. REV. 1, 3 (2001); Robert P. Merges, As Many as Six Impossible Patents Before
Breakfast: Property Rights for Business Concepts and Patent System Reform, 14 BERKELEY TE:CIL
1.4. 577, 589-90 (1999); Meurer, supra note 198, at 311-14; John R. Thomas, The Patenting
of thc Liberal Professions, 40 B.C. L. REV. 1139, 1139-40 (1999).
2" Merges. supra note 204, at 606-09 (suggesting improved incentives and training for
examiners would increase patent quality).
206 See Lemley, supra note 29, at 1510-11 (asserting that limited patent examination is
the best policy because improved "examination procedures will largely be wasted on exam-
ining the ninety-five percent of patents that will either never he used, or will be used in
circumstances that don't crucially rely on the determination of validity.").
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effectively. It may be appropriate to complement these control meas-
ures by restricting certain IP rights. 207 Many of the cases reporting in-
stances of possible opportunistic or anti-competitive litigation come
from specific kinds of subject matter that could be targeted for special
treatment: business method patents, trade dress protection of product
design, and copyrights on art reproductions.
The existence of business method patents generates a substantial
hazard of opportunistic lawsuits because of the rapid pace of inven-
tion and the heterogeneous character of the inventors in this field.
Business method users inadvertently expose themselves to opportun-
istic suits because independent invention is likely and surveillance of
research activity by other potential inventors is difficult. Consequently,
many business method users make a commitment to a business
method before they learn that the method might be covered by a pat-
ent or patent application. Congress responded to this problem by cre-
ating a first inventor defense, but the scope of this defense is too nar-
row to be very helpful. 208 Several commentators have called for the
reversal of Stale Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Financial Group,
Inc.,209 the recent case that allowed business method patents, 21 ° as well
as less drastic reforms including a patent opposition procedure 211 and
a stricter nonobviousness standard for business method inventions. 212
Anti-competitive trade dress litigation based on product design is
especially worrisome. Manufacturers expose themselves to trade dress
liability because it is hard to identify unregistered trade dress and it is
hard to decide whether trade dress is distinctive and non-func-
tional.213 Mindful of the danger of anti-competitive lawsuits, the courts
have recently reversed the long-running expansion of trade dress pro-
tection under Section 43(a) of the Lanham Act. 2 " Critics of trade
207 Of coarse, such restrictions sacrifice the social benefits associated with the IP rights
discussed below.
208 The defense excuses from infringement those inventors who choose to practice
their new business method as a trade secret instead of patenting it.
200 149 F.3c1 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998).
210 See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss, Are Business Method Patents Bad for Business?, 16 SANTA
CLARA COMPUTER & HIGH TECH. L.J. 263,277 (2000); Meurer, supra note 198, at 311-14;
Thomas, supra note 204, at 1185.
211 See Merges, supra note 204, at 610-15.
2 " See Meurer, supra note 198, at 311-14.
218 For trade dress to be protected under § 43(a) of the Lanham Act, a plaintiff must
prove it is used in commerce, is non-functional, and is distinctive, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (2000).
214 See TrafFix Devices, Inc. v. Mktg. Displays, Inc., 532 U.S. 23,34-35 (2001); Wal-Mart
v. Samara Bros., 529 U.S. 205,216 (2000); McCarthy, supra note 80, at 46.
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dress protection of product design have called for its abolition. 215 A
more moderate proposal limits relief for infringement to an informa-
tional labeling requirement. 21 °
Copyright infringement suits based on art reproductions also
pose a significant anti-competitive risk. The first party to make an art
reproduction like the plastic bank featured in L. Bodin & Son v. Snyder
might deter imitators because of the uncertainty inherent in a weak
originality requirement217 and the cost of copyright litigation. 218 To
reduce this risk, courts and commentators insist on a rigorous appli-
cation of originality that would leave some art reproductions unpro-
tected by copyright. 219
CONCLUSION
It is useful to think of IP law both as a system of property rights
that promotes the production of valuable information and as a system
of government regulation that, unintentionally promotes socially
harmful rent-seeking. This Article analyzes methods of controlling
rent-seeking costs associated with opportunistic and anti-competitive
IP lawsuits, My thinking is guided to some extent by the analysis of
procedural measures for controlling frivolous litigation and the analy-
sis of antitrust reforms designed to control strategic abuse of antitrust
law. These analogies lead me to focus on pre- and post-trial control
measures that reduce the credibility of weak IP lawsuits. I conclude
that IP courts show some awareness of the value of fee shifting and
summary judgment as tools for controlling opportunistic and anti-
competitive lawsuits. Yet, courts display less awareness of the need to
restrict preliminary injunctions or encourage declaratory judgments
215 Sec Dinwoodie, supra note 67, at 663 n.205 (collecting citations to scholars and
judges who would exclude trademark protection of product design).
216 Sec id. at 739 (favoring protection of functional and distinctive product design as
long as informational labeling relieves the defendant of liability for copying the design);
Reichman, Past and Current Trends in the Evoloution of Design Protection Law —A Coni-
Md, 4 FORD, 1N'I'ELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 387, 395 (1993) (explaining the value of
labeling to avoid confusing trade dress).
217 DOUGLAS LICHTMAN, COPYRIGHT AS A RULE Or EVIDENCE 18 (Univ. of Chi., John
M. Olin Law & Economics Working Paper Series No. 151, May 2002), at littp://www.law.
uchicago.edu/Lawecon/indexiaml (emphasizing evidentiary problems created by a weak
originality standard).
218 Id. at 20.
216 See supra note 31; LICHTMAN, supra note 217, at 1 (stating that the originality re-
quirement, as well as the fixation requirement and the merger doctrine, are "best under-
stood as tools that exclude from the copyright regime cases for which the costs of litigation
would be intolerably high.").
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as control measures. Antitrust suits have only a limited role in deter-
ring the most egregious anti-competitive conduct. Besides attacking
the credibility of weak lawsuits, it is probably desirable to eliminate
the threat of some kinds of IP lawsuits entirely. This could be accom-
plished by eliminating or restricting IP rights such as business method
patents, trade dress protection of product configuration and design,
and copyright protection of art reproductions. In other words, it may
be desirable to curtail the "standing" of parties who own IP rights that.
generate a substantial threat of opportunistic or anti-competitive liti-
gation with little corresponding benefit in terms of productive incen-
tives. 22°
220 See Dreyfuss, supra note 210, at 274 ("113)usiness methods are not the only example
of newly created or expanded intellectual property rights. There is also database protec-
tion, dilution, blurring, cybersquatting, and misappropriation. A strange aspect to many of
these expansions is that they occur without any specific thought given to the need for pro-
tection.").
